---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/qwenproxy-cli/v/1.4.0"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/qwenproxy-cli/v/1.4.0.md"
package: "qwenproxy-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "1.4.0"
---

# qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as AI-agent capability risk** — Allowed by default with warning: agent-facing configuration or capability changes need review before use.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only AI-agent capability risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** AI-agent capability abuse
- **Selected version:** 1.4.0
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The package exposes a real, explicit-user-command capability to alter an AI agent's configuration and credentials. Static inspection found no automatic lifecycle trigger, covert exfiltration, or confirmed malicious payload.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-28T00:29:46.992Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-28T00:33:04.556Z
- **Download time:** 511 ms
- **Static scan time:** 4900 ms
- **AI review time:** 192152 ms
- **Total time:** 197564 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** No confirmed covert attack surface was identified. An explicit sync command can modify Codex configuration to use this package's gateway.

- **Trigger:** The user runs qpx sync or the sync script.

- **Impact:** This can redirect later Codex requests through the configured gateway; it is a user-invoked agent configuration capability, not an install-time mutation.

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-28T00:33:04.556Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The synchronizer writes a provider block, API key, endpoint, and optional active-model settings to Codex configuration.

- **Rationale:** The package exposes a real, explicit-user-command capability to alter an AI agent's configuration and credentials. Static inspection found no automatic lifecycle trigger, covert exfiltration, or confirmed malicious payload.

- **Files touched:** src/sync/codex.ts, src/sync/index.ts, src/sync-clients.ts, bin/qwenproxy.js, dist/index.js, dist/sync-clients.js

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 90.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The CLI routes the explicit sync command to the client synchronization program., The synchronization command defaults to all detected clients when no targets are supplied., Codex synchronization writes a QwenProxy provider and supplied API key into the Codex configuration, and can make it active., The configured OpenAI-compatible endpoint is derived from the selected local host and port., The bundled entrypoints contain the same Codex synchronization behavior., The package scripts shown are build, prepack, and user-invoked commands; no install lifecycle hook is present.

- **Evidence against:** No automatic install-time configuration mutation was found., No confirmed credential export or unrelated remote endpoint was found in the inspected synchronization path.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0.

- Review the evidence and your use of qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/bin/update.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L7: 
L8: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L9: import fs from "node:fs";
```

### 3. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/update.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/bin/update.js>)

Package source references shell execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L91: encoding: "utf-8",
L92: shell: true,
L93: timeout: 30000,
```

### 4. Low: Weak Crypto
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 64.0%
- **Path:** dist/delete-chats.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/dist/delete-chats.js>)

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L25: function getOsGlobalDataDir(options) {
L26: const currentPlatform = options?.platform || process.platform;
L27: const home = options?.homeDir || os.homedir();
L28: if (currentPlatform === "win32") {
L29: const winPath = path.win32 || path;
L30: const appData = options?.appData || process.env.APPDATA || winPath.join(home, "AppData", "Roaming");
L31: return winPath.join(appData, "qwenproxy");
...
L54: platform: options?.platform,
L55: appData: options?.appData,
L56: homeDir: options?.homeDir,
...
L107: if (fs2.existsSync(KEY_PATH)) {
L108: cachedKey = Buffer.from(fs2.readFileSync(KEY_PATH, "utf-8"), "hex");
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** bin/qwenproxy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/bin/qwenproxy.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L163: const cmd = process.platform === "win32" ? "npx.cmd" : "npx";
L164: return spawnSync(cmd, ["--yes", "patchright", "install", "chromium"], {
L165: stdio: "inherit",
...
L169: 
L170: let chosenHost = process.env.PLAYWRIGHT_DOWNLOAD_HOST;
L171: if (!chosenHost) {
...
L175: try {
L176: const probe = await fetch("https://cdn.playwright.dev", { method: "HEAD", signal: controller.signal });
L177: clearTimeout(probeTimer);
```

### 9. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/dist/index.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L55: function getOsGlobalDataDir(options) {
L56: const currentPlatform = options?.platform || process.platform;
L57: const home = options?.homeDir || os.homedir();
L58: if (currentPlatform === "win32") {
L59: const winPath = path.win32 || path;
L60: const appData = options?.appData || process.env.APPDATA || winPath.join(home, "AppData", "Roaming");
L61: return winPath.join(appData, "qwenproxy");
...
L84: platform: options?.platform,
L85: appData: options?.appData,
L86: homeDir: options?.homeDir,
...
L342: MID_STREAM_FAILOVER_BUSY_MS: z.string().default("60000"),
L343: QWEN_BASE_URL: z.string().default("https://chat.qwen.ai"),
```

### 10. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** bin/qwenproxy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/bin/qwenproxy.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L15: */
L16: process.env.DOTENV_CONFIG_QUIET = "true";
L17: 
L18: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L19: import path from "node:path";
...
L24: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L25: const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L26: const packageRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
L27: const packageJsonPath = path.join(packageRoot, "package.json");
L28: 
...
L34: try {
L35: const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf-8"));
```

### 11. High: Cloud Metadata Access
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/dist/index.js>)

Source reaches cloud instance metadata or link-local credential endpoints.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L55: function getOsGlobalDataDir(options) {
L56: const currentPlatform = options?.platform || process.platform;
L57: const home = options?.homeDir || os.homedir();
L58: if (currentPlatform === "win32") {
L59: const winPath = path.win32 || path;
L60: const appData = options?.appData || process.env.APPDATA || winPath.join(home, "AppData", "Roaming");
L61: return winPath.join(appData, "qwenproxy");
...
L84: platform: options?.platform,
L85: appData: options?.appData,
L86: homeDir: options?.homeDir,
...
L342: MID_STREAM_FAILOVER_BUSY_MS: z.string().default("60000"),
L343: QWEN_BASE_URL: z.string().default("https://chat.qwen.ai"),
```

### 12. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 72.0%
- **Path:** bin/qwenproxy.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/qwenproxy-cli@1.4.0/bin/qwenproxy.js>)

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Cross-file remote execution chain: bin/qwenproxy.js spawns dist/clean-cache.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution.
L15: */
L16: process.env.DOTENV_CONFIG_QUIET = "true";
L17: 
L18: import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
L19: import path from "node:path";
...
L24: const require = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L25: const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
L26: const packageRoot = path.resolve(__dirname, "..");
L27: const packageJsonPath = path.join(packageRoot, "package.json");
L28: 
...
L34: try {
L35: const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(packageJsonPath, "utf-8"));
```

### 13. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 14. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 15. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 9
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 4
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 9

### Published dependency entries
- @hono/node-server ^2.1.1 (Dependency)
- ali-oss ^6.23.0 (Dependency)
- better-sqlite3 ^13.0.3 (Dependency)
- dotenv ^17.4.2 (Dependency)
- hono ^4.13.7 (Dependency)
- patchright 1.63.0 (Dependency)
- tsx ^4.23.13 (Dependency)
- uuid ^14.0.2 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.5.4 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** qwenproxy-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.4.0
- **License:** ISC
- **Version published:** 2026-09-26T03:01:49.534Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-09-08T15:18:43.935Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-10-29T01:45:09.228Z
- **Known versions:** 51
- **Latest version:** 1.6.10
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** High-performance OpenAI & Anthropic compatible API gateway for Qwen with multi-account rotation, interactive TUI, and resilient tool calling.
- **Author:** johngbl
- **Maintainers:** johngbl
- **Keywords:** qwen, proxy, openai, anthropic, claude-code, codex, opencode, tui, patchright, playwright, llm
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=22
- **Artifact files:** 132
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,068,694 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/qwenproxy-cli/v/1.4.0>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/johngbl/qwenproxy>)
- [Homepage](<https://github.com/johngbl/qwenproxy#readme>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/johngbl/qwenproxy/issues>)