--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/rbzz-backup" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/rbzz-backup/report.md" package: "rbzz-backup" report_status: "published" title: "rbzz-backup@1.0.3 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "1.0.3" --- # rbzz-backup@1.0.3 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Photos may be sent to a publisher-selected Telegram account without the user configuring or confirming that recipient. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Data Exfiltration - **Selected version:** 1.0.3 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The documented default workflow forwards users' camera photos to a hard-coded Telegram recipient that they are not told to configure. This is concrete, undisclosed data exfiltration when users follow the package's setup instructions. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 96.0% - **Started:** 2026-10-31T14:42:46.419Z - **Finished:** 2026-10-31T14:43:12.586Z - **Download time:** 259 ms - **Static scan time:** 50 ms - **AI review time:** 25857 ms - **Total time:** 26167 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The documented server-and-client workflow forwards camera photos to a Telegram chat selected by hard-coded default credentials. - **Trigger:** A user starts the server and runs the CLI with SERVER\_URL set, following the README instructions. - **Impact:** Photos may be sent to a publisher-selected Telegram account without the user configuring or confirming that recipient. - **Evidence paths:** README.md, src/index.js, server/server.js, src/scanner.js, src/config.js, src/uploader.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-10-31T14:43:12.586Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI repeatedly scans the configured camera directory and posts new photos to the server; the server forwards each received photo to Telegram using its built-in bot token and chat ID unless overridden. - **Attack narrative:** Following the documented setup requires only a server URL and camera directory. When the client runs, it continuously sends newly found photos to that server, whose defaults forward them to a hard-coded Telegram bot and chat. This sends potentially private photos to a recipient chosen in the package source unless the operator separately discovers and overrides those defaults. - **Rationale:** The documented default workflow forwards users' camera photos to a hard-coded Telegram recipient that they are not told to configure. This is concrete, undisclosed data exfiltration when users follow the package's setup instructions. - **Files touched:** .backup\_history.json - **Network endpoints:** https://api.telegram.org/bot${BOT\_TOKEN}/sendPhoto ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** The README tells users to configure only a server URL and camera directory, then run the client to automatically send new photos through the server., When a server URL is configured, the CLI continuously scans for new photos and uploads them without further prompts., The server has hard-coded default Telegram bot credentials and a hard-coded chat ID., The server's upload endpoint accepts requests with no API key and forwards uploaded photos to the configured Telegram chat. - **Evidence against:** The package describes itself as a photo backup tool that sends images to Telegram., The Telegram bot token, chat ID, and API secret can be overridden through environment variables., The user must start the server and run the CLI for the forwarding flow to occur. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to rbzz-backup@1.0.3. - Avoid installing rbzz-backup@1.0.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 3. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 4. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 5. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: // Đọc file .env từ thư mục gốc nếu có L8: const envPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '../.env'); L9: if (fs.existsSync(envPath)) { ... L16: const val = trimmed.slice(idx + 1).trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ''); L17: if (!process.env[key]) process.env[key] = val; L18: } ... L29: L30: app.use(express.json()); L31: ... L37: // Endpoint nhận file từ client và chuyển tiếp lên Telegram L38: app.post('/api/upload', upload.single('photo'), async (req, res) => { L39: const clientKey = req.headers['x-api-key']; ``` ### 6. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: // Đọc file .env từ thư mục gốc nếu có L8: const envPath = path.resolve(__dirname, '../.env'); L9: if (fs.existsSync(envPath)) { ... L16: const val = trimmed.slice(idx + 1).trim().replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ''); L17: if (!process.env[key]) process.env[key] = val; L18: } ... L29: L30: app.use(express.json()); L31: ... L37: // Endpoint nhận file từ client và chuyển tiếp lên Telegram L38: app.post('/api/upload', upload.single('photo'), async (req, res) => { L39: const clientKey = req.headers['x-api-key']; ``` ### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 8. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 9. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 10. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Path:** README.md - **Public source:** [View source]() The README tells users to configure only a server URL and camera directory, then run the client to automatically send new photos through the server. Public source snippet (untrusted): ````markdown ## 3. Cấu hình Client (Termux / Máy trạm) Chỉ cần cấu hình địa chỉ Server: ```bash export SERVER_URL="http://IP_SERVER_CUA_BAN:3000" export TARGET_DIR="/sdcard/DC ```` ### 11. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Path:** src/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() When a server URL is configured, the CLI continuously scans for new photos and uploads them without further prompts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript async function main() { console.log('=== Telegram Photo Auto-Sync (rbzz) ==='); const config = getConfig(); const useServer = Boolean(config.serverUrl); if (!useServer && ``` ### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 96.0% - **Path:** server/server.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The server has hard-coded default Telegram bot credentials and a hard-coded chat ID. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const PORT = process.env.PORT || 3000; const BOT_TOKEN = process.env.TG_BOT_TOKEN || '8904557832:AAGb_LG0IFcPN-byfczsWGqjCyZ1-FHo6_I'; const CHAT_ID = process.env.TG_CHAT_ID || '8582336171'; ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** rbzz-backup - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.0.3 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-10-31T14:41:06.857Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-31T14:32:46.642Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-31T14:43:12.586Z - **Known versions:** 2 - **Latest version:** 1.0.3 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** CLI tool to backup camera photos to Telegram Bot - **Keywords:** telegram, backup, photos, cli, termux, camera - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 9 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 48,672 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()