react-next-dom@17.2.7

react-next-dom masquerades as a React/Next.js ecosystem package but ships a pino-like surface concealing a remote code loader. The main export is a middleware factory that, when invoked, spawns `node./lib/caller.js` as a detached, stdio-ignored child process (`spawn("node", [script,...], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }); child.unref()`). lib/caller.js then fetches a JavaScript payload from https://jsonkeeper.com/b/D3GLF (using an `x-secret-key` header), and evaluates the response body in the host Node.js process via `new Function.constructor("require", s)(require)`, retrying up to 5 times. Additional payload URLs (https://jsonkeeper.com/b/XRGF3, https://jsonkeeper.com/b/4NAKK) are hidden as base64 blobs disguised as `DEV_API_KEY` constants in lib/caller.js and lib/const.js. jsonkeeper.com is an anonymous public paste service — content is attacker-mutable, and the executed code runs with full `require` access, giving the operator arbitrary code execution on any host that loads this package's middleware. The package name evokes react/react-dom/next.js while the shipped code impersonates pino (keywords `fast`,`logger`,`stream`,`json`; files `pino.js`, transport, multistream, redaction; `module.exports.pino = middleware`), a typosquat/impersonation cover for the loader. ## Source: ghsa-malware (2a7b3360c09fca3400981d3d0d4c5e8a72c8193e0841c5d2eceb193a08fc440e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.