recess-cli@3.12.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has an automatic postinstall that modifies Codex and Claude skill directories by installing its own skill. Policy classifies first-party package-owned agent extension setup as suspicious and warning-only; the inspected behavior does not establish a malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.mjs.
- The published-install hook calls installSkill() without a consent prompt.
- installSkill() replaces the recess-cli skill in agent skill directories and removes a superseded skill directory.
- The skill destinations are the user's Codex and Claude skill directories.
- apps init writes AGENTS.md only when that explicit command runs.
- Authentication sends an SSO assertion to the configured Recess API origin.
- The postinstall hook skips source checkouts and imports the package's own setup module.
- The installation behavior is first-party agent skill setup, which is warning-only under policy.
- The inspected authentication flow sends an SSO assertion to the API origin configured by the CLI.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.12.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.12.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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