recess-cli@3.17.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically mutates agent skill directories as part of first-party package setup, which meets the warning criteria for package-owned agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected scope does not establish a malicious attack or block-eligible behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs scripts/postinstall.mjs after installation.
- The hook imports and runs installSkill() in a published install when dist/setup.js exists.
- installSkill() targets the package's own recess-cli skill directories for Codex and Claude, removes and replaces those directories, and also removes the superseded recess-admin skill.
- The apps init command writes AGENTS.md into the user-selected app folder when explicitly invoked.
- The lifecycle hook skips source checkouts, and its filesystem changes are limited to the named Recess skill directories.
- The inspected apps init behavior is command-triggered and writes into the selected app folder.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.17.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.17.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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