recess-cli@3.19.1
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe install hook makes a user-level agent skill change automatically, which fits the warning-only policy for package-owned agent setup. The inspected sources do not establish a concrete malicious attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines postinstall as `node scripts/postinstall.mjs`, which imports the bundled setup module and calls `installSkill()` automatically.
- Setup targets the user-level Codex and Claude `recess-cli` skill folders, removes each existing destination, and copies in the bundled skill.
- The bundled skill is a Recess CLI instruction router, making this package-owned agent setup; its installation is still an automatic user-level change.
- The separate AGENTS.md write occurs under the explicit `apps init` command and creates local app authoring instructions.
- The inspected postinstall installs this package's own named skill; it does not establish a broad foreign agent configuration change or credential transfer.
- The AGENTS.md behavior is triggered by `apps init`, not by package installation.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.19.1.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.19.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.