registry / recess-cli / 3.19.3
recess-cli@3.19.3
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package performs an unattended postinstall change to Codex and Claude skill directories, which is a first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack or justify blocking publication.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Installing the published package through npm and running its postinstall hook.
Impact
Agent instructions in those skill directories are replaced during package installation; the inspected hook does not fetch the separately served skill bundle.
Mechanism
The hook imports dist/setup.js and copies the bundled skill into the configured Codex and Claude skill directories after removing the existing recess-cli directory.
AI rationale
The package performs an unattended postinstall change to Codex and Claude skill directories, which is a first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack or justify blocking publication.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.mjsdist/setup.jsdist/cli.jsdist/skill-update.jsdist/commands/apps.js$CODEX_HOME/skills/recess-cli$CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/skills/recess-cli
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 86.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- package.json registers a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.mjs.
- On a published install, the hook calls installSkill automatically; it exits for a source checkout.
- The hook installs the bundled Recess skill under the Codex and Claude skill directories, removing the existing recess-cli directory first.
- The server-served skill update runs through the explicit setup command, separately from postinstall.
- The apps scaffold command writes generated authoring instructions to a project AGENTS.md file.
Evidence against
- The automatic install copies this package's bundled skill into its named skill directories; the inspected hook does not fetch a remote bundle.
- The AGENTS.md write is part of the apps scaffold command, rather than the npm lifecycle hook.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/commands/onboarding.jsView file
564patternName = generic_password
severity = medium
line = 564
Medium
Secret Pattern
Package contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
2 High6 Medium5 Low
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/cli.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumSecret Patterndist/commands/onboarding.js
MediumDynamic Requirescripts/postinstall.mjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.19.3.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.19.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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