recess-cli@3.21.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 8d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active postinstall hook automatically replaces package-owned skills in user-level agent directories. This warrants a warning for agent extension lifecycle risk, while the inspected skill and setup code do not establish concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json registers a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.mjs.
- On a packaged install, the hook calls installSkill when dist/setup.js exists.
- installSkill targets the user's Codex and Claude skill directories, replaces the recess-cli skill there with the bundled copy, and removes a superseded skill directory.
- The bundled skill routes agents to Recess CLI commands and describes its authentication and confirmation contracts.
- The apps init command separately writes AGENTS.md into the selected app directory.
- The automatic setup installs this package's own skill; inspected code does not establish a malicious payload or broader agent configuration change.
- Fetching an additional server skill copy occurs in the CLI setup path, not in the postinstall hook.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L576Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.21.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.21.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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