recess-cli@3.22.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe unattended postinstall modifies user-level agent skill directories, so this package-owned extension setup warrants a warning. The inspected behavior is scoped to the Recess CLI skill and does not establish a broader attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.mjs.
- On published installs, the hook imports the bundled setup module and calls installSkill().
- The installer targets the recess-cli skill directory under the configured or default Codex and Claude skill roots.
- installSkill removes each target directory and copies the package’s bundled skill into it.
- The AGENTS.md write is in apps init for the supplied app folder, reached through the apps command.
- The automatic skill write is scoped to the package’s named skill directories; the apps init write is an explicit command targeting a local app folder.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L576Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.22.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.22.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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