recess-cli@3.23.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically replaces package-owned skills in global Codex and Claude skill folders and removes the legacy skill directory. This creates agent extension lifecycle risk, but the inspected source does not establish a broader control-surface attack, so the appropriate action is a warning.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest registers a postinstall hook that runs the package script.
- For published installs, the hook imports the setup module and calls the skill installer; source checkouts and installs missing that module exit early.
- The installer targets Codex and Claude skill folders under their configuration homes, with environment-variable overrides.
- The installer recursively replaces each recess-cli skill folder and removes the legacy recess-admin folder.
- The bundled skill describes itself as a router for using the Recess command and related agent guidance.
- The AGENTS.md integration target is written by apps init into a selected folder; that command refuses a nonempty folder unless forced.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L576Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.23.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.23.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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