recess-cli@3.4.1
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall hook automatically writes the package-owned skill into agent skill directories, so this merits a warning as first-party agent extension setup. The inspected source does not establish a concrete malicious attack or credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall hook for published installs.
- The hook imports and calls the skill installer when the package is not a checkout.
- The installer targets Codex and Claude skill directories and replaces their recess-cli skill contents.
- The apps init command writes AGENTS.md as part of an explicit project scaffold command.
- The automatically installed content is the package’s own skill, and the hook skips source checkouts.
- The inspected authentication exchange sends an assertion to the configured Recess API origin.
- No credential exfiltration or unrelated network recipient was identified in the inspected code.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.4.1.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.4.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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