recess-cli@3.6.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe published postinstall hook automatically replaces Recess’s own agent skill files, so this warrants a warning for first-party agent extension lifecycle behavior. The inspected code does not establish unconsented broad agent configuration mutation or another concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json registers a postinstall hook that runs scripts/postinstall.mjs.
- On published installs, the hook imports dist/setup.js and calls installSkill().
- installSkill() deletes and recopies the recess-cli skill in the Codex and Claude skill directories, and removes the legacy recess-admin skill directory.
- The CLI also writes AGENTS.md during the explicit apps init command.
- The automatic setup targets Recess’s own named skill directories; inspected code shows no write to broad agent configuration or control surfaces.
- The apps command writes AGENTS.md only as part of an explicit project scaffold operation.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.6.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.6.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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