recess-cli@3.7.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall mutation of agent skill directories is a concrete first-party agent extension lifecycle capability, so this merits a warning under the agent integration policy. The inspected behavior is limited to the package's own skill and does not establish malicious attack behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall script during installation.
- The hook imports and calls installSkill for non-checkout installs.
- installSkill replaces skill directories under the user's Codex and Claude configuration roots with the package's bundled skill.
- The agent configuration write in apps.js occurs only when the user invokes the apps init command.
- The automatic setup installs the package's own recess-cli skill, and does not execute a remote payload.
- The apps init command checks for a nonempty destination and requires --force before writing over it.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.7.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.