recess-cli@3.9.0
Safe Recess administration and family AI tools from the command line.
AI Security Review
scanned 14d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe postinstall automatically mutates Codex and Claude skill directories. Because it installs the package's own Recess skill, the applicable policy calls for a warning rather than a block; no concrete malicious behavior was established in the inspected path.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall hook that imports and invokes installSkill for published installs.
- The installer writes the bundled Recess skill into the user's Codex and Claude skill directories and replaces existing copies.
- The installer also removes a superseded skill directory; this is automatic agent configuration mutation during install.
- The apps command's AGENTS.md write occurs as part of an explicit project scaffolding command, separate from postinstall.
- The installed skill is package-owned and names the Recess CLI; this fits the first-party setup warning category.
- The postinstall skips source checkouts and silently catches failures; no remote payload or credential forwarding is established by the inspected setup path.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage contains a possible secret pattern.
dist/commands/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L564Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to recess-cli@3.9.0.
See all versions of recess-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of recess-cli@3.9.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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