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replicas-engine@0.1.805: Malicious npm security report (Block) | LPM Firewall

registry / replicas-engine / 0.1.805

replicas-engine@0.1.805

Lightweight API server for Replicas workspaces

AI Security Review

scanned 28d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

When the engine runs, it reads agent credentials and uploads completed chat transcripts plus credential metadata to its configured monolith service. It also changes Git credential-helper settings during startup.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

Running the replicas-engine entrypoint and completing an agent turn.

Impact

Agent conversations and credential snapshots can be disclosed to the configured remote service; Git authentication behavior is altered.

Mechanism

Automatic credential-bearing transcript upload and Git credential-helper configuration.

Attack narrative

After the user runs the engine, completion of an agent turn invokes transcript upload automatically. The uploader reads the transcript, attaches the active agent credential snapshot as metadata, requests an upload URL from the configured monolith, and uploads the transcript. Startup also installs a Git credential helper through global Git configuration. These actions occur at runtime rather than npm installation, but expose credentials and conversations without a per-upload user action.

AI rationale

The code establishes automatic exfiltration of credential-bearing chat metadata and transcript contents to a remote endpoint, plus runtime mutation of Git credential handling. The absence of an install hook reduces installation risk but does not remove the concrete runtime credential and data exposure.

Evidence

dist/src/index.jsdist/src/chunk-6TQWCSXK.js~/.replicas/engine/claude-histories/*.jsonl~/.replicas/engine/codex-histories/*.jsonl~/.replicas/engine/relay-histories/*.jsonl

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.jsView file

318// ../node_modules/.bun/pi-mcp-adapter@2.32.1+04b0d7b0bc944965/node_modules/pi-mcp-adapter/utils.ts L319: import { spawnSync } from "child_process"; L320: import { homedir as homedir2, platform } from "os";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.jsView on unpkg · L318

407const result = spawnSync(value.slice(1), { L408: shell: true, L409: encoding: "utf8",

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.jsView on unpkg · L407

dist/src/index.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = replicas-engine@0.1.795 matchedIdentity = npm:cmVwbGljYXMtZW5naW5l:0.1.795 similarity = 0.929 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg

50044function envKillSwitch(name) { L50045: const value = process.env[name]?.trim().toLowerCase(); L50046: if (!value) return void 0; ... L50057: // ../node_modules/.bun/pi-mcp-adapter@2.32.1+04b0d7b0bc944965/node_modules/pi-mcp-adapter/ui-session.ts L50058: import { execFile as execFile6 } from "child_process"; L50059: import { randomUUID as randomUUID11 } from "crypto"; L50060: import net from "net"; L50061:

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg · L50044

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/src/index.js: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, unlink, writeFile } from "fs/promises"; async function atomicWriteFile(path7, data, options) { await writeFile(tmpFile, data, { encoding: "utf-8", mode: options?.mode }); await atomicWriteFile(filePath, content, { mode: 384 }); await atomicWriteFile(helperPath, buildGitCredentialHelperScript(credentialsPath), { mode: 448 }); await atomicWriteFile(STATE_FILE, JSON.stringify(nextState, null, 2)); headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, async fetchFreshCredentials(failureReason, failureKind = "rejected", failedCredential = ENGINE_ENV.REPLICAS_AGENT_CREDENTIALS.claude, allowedMeth

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg

137Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/src/index.js spawns dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L137: SUBPROCESS_MAX_BUFFER, L138: execAsync, L139: execFileAsync ... L359: function checkPathExt(path7, options) { L360: var pathext = options.pathExt !== void 0 ? options.pathExt : process.env.PATHEXT; L361: if (!pathext) { ... L432: var core; L433: if (process.platform === "win32" || global.TESTING_WINDOWS) { L434: core = require_windows(); ... L495: // windows always checks the cwd first L496: ...isWindows ? [process.cwd()] : [], L497: ...(opt.path || process.env.PATH || /* istanbul ignore next: very unusual */

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg · L137

scripts/engine-watchdog.shView file

•path = scripts/engine-watchdog.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3679 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/engine-watchdog.shView on unpkg

dist/src/chunk-ZR7K5GRR.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/src/chunk-ZR7K5GRR.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.jsView file

Lines 298-338javascript

298}

299function readPiConfig() {

300 const dir = process.env.PI_PACKAGE_DIR?.trim();

301 if (!dir) return void 0;

302 try {

303 const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(resolve(dir), "package.json"), "utf8"));

304 return manifest.piConfig;

305 } catch {

306 return void 0;

307 }

308}

309function getAppName() {

310 const name = readPiConfig()?.name;

311 return typeof name === "string" && name.trim() ? name.trim() : "pi";

312}

313function getAppClientUri() {

314 const uri = readPiConfig()?.clientUri;

315 return typeof uri === "string" && uri.trim() ? uri.trim() : void 0;

316}

317

318// ../node_modules/.bun/pi-mcp-adapter@2.32.1+04b0d7b0bc944965/node_modules/pi-mcp-adapter/utils.ts

319import { spawnSync } from "child_process";

320import { homedir as homedir2, platform } from "os";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/src/chunk-BMC4R5IZ.jsView on unpkg · L318

321import { extname, isAbsolute, join as join2 } from "path";

322async function execOpen(pi, target, browser, signal) {

323 const os2 = platform();

324 if (os2 === "darwin") {

325 if (browser) {

326 return isAbsolute(browser) && extname(browser).toLowerCase() !== ".app" ? pi.exec(browser, [target], signal ? { signal } : {}) : pi.exec("open", ["-a", browser, target], signal ? { signal } : {});

327 }

328 return pi.exec("open", [target], signal ? { signal } : {});

329 }

330 if (os2 === "win32") {

331 return browser ? pi.exec("cmd", ["/c", "start", "", browser, target], signal ? { signal } : {}) : pi.exec("cmd", ["/c", "start", "", target], signal ? { signal } : {});

332 }

333 return browser ? pi.exec(browser, [target], signal ? { signal } : {}) : pi.exec("xdg-open", [target], signal ? { signal } : {});

334}

335async function openUrl(pi, url, browser, signal) {

336 const result = await execOpen(pi, url, browser, signal);

337 if (result.code !== 0) {

338 throw new Error(result.stderr || `Failed to open browser (exit code ${result.code})`);

Lines 387-427javascript

387 }

388 return Object.keys(result).length > 0 ? result : void 0;

389}

390function interpolateSecretExpression(value, environment

dist/src/index.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = replicas-engine@0.1.795 matchedIdentity = npm:cmVwbGljYXMtZW5naW5l:0.1.795 similarity = 0.929 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg

50044function envKillSwitch(name) { L50045: const value = process.env[name]?.trim().toLowerCase(); L50046: if (!value) return void 0; ... L50057: // ../node_modules/.bun/pi-mcp-adapter@2.32.1+04b0d7b0bc944965/node_modules/pi-mcp-adapter/ui-session.ts L50058: import { execFile as execFile6 } from "child_process"; L50059: import { randomUUID as randomUUID11 } from "crypto"; L50060: import net from "net"; L50061:

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/src/index.jsView on unpkg · L50044

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/src/index.js: import { mkdir, readFile, rename, unlink, writeFile } from "fs/promises"; async function atomicWriteFile(path7, data, options) { await writeFile(tmpFile, data, { encoding: "utf-8", mode: options?.mode }); await atomicWriteFile(filePath, content, { mode: 384 }); await atomicWriteFile(helperPath, buildGitCredentialHelperScript(credentialsPath), { mode: 448 }); await atomicWriteFile(STATE_FILE, JSON.stringify(nextState, null, 2)); headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, async fetchFreshCredentials(failureReason, failureKind = "rejected", failedCredential = ENGINE_ENV.REPLICAS_AGENT_CREDENTIALS.claude, allowedMeth

scripts/engine-watchdog.shView file

•path = scripts/engine-watchdog.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 3679 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/engine-watchdog.shView on unpkg

dist/src/chunk-ZR7K5GRR.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/src/chunk-ZR7K5GRR.jsView on unpkg