resend-cli@2.14.0
The official CLI for Resend
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic hints conflate local credential-store commands and bounded CLI telemetry with exfiltration. Direct inspection found no lifecycle execution or concrete malicious chain.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- Package exposes only a user-invoked CLI binary; no install lifecycle hook is declared.
- Telemetry records bounded CLI metadata and supports opt-out.
- Credential handling uses the local Resend config path and OS credential stores.
- Child-process use is limited to local credential-store utilities.
- No source evidence sends user credentials, command output, or harvested files to a remote receiver.
- Network use is package-aligned: Resend API operations and PostHog CLI telemetry.
- Default telemetry creates a local anonymous identifier, but its payload schema excludes credential/config data.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedSource sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to resend-cli@2.14.0.
See all versions of resend-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of resend-cli@2.14.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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