registry / resend-cli / 2.21.0
resend-cli@2.21.0
The official CLI for Resend
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe scanner's command, environment, file, and network findings map to normal CLI functions, credential storage, update checks, and disclosed anonymous telemetry. Source inspection found no lifecycle trigger or concrete credential or command-output exfiltration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
Running a Resend CLI command.
Impact
Normal Resend account operations; telemetry sends non-secret command metadata when not opted out.
Mechanism
CLI API calls and anonymous usage telemetry
AI rationale
The scanner's command, environment, file, and network findings map to normal CLI functions, credential storage, update checks, and disclosed anonymous telemetry. Source inspection found no lifecycle trigger or concrete credential or command-output exfiltration.
Network endpoints3
api.resend.comapi.github.comus.i.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The package exposes a user-invoked CLI entrypoint and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- The CLI states that it collects anonymous usage data and provides an opt-out.
Evidence against
- Telemetry payload construction contains command metadata, platform, Node version, flags, and an anonymous identifier; it does not include API keys or credential-file contents.
- The detached child process only invokes this CLI's hidden telemetry flush command.
- Network use is aligned with the Resend API, update checks, and disclosed telemetry.
- No install-time execution, broad project mutation, credential exfiltration, or persistence was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedTelemetryUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
9 flaggeddist/cli.cjsView file
1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Pu=Object.create;var xi=Object.defineProperty;var $u=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Gu=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var Hu=Object.getPrototypeOf,Qu=Object.proto...
L3: `)}displayWidth(t){return Lr(t).length}styleTitle(t){return t}styleUsage(t){return t.split(" ").map(o=>o==="[options]"?this.styleOptionText(o):o==="[command]"?this.styleSubcommandT...
...
L13: (Did you mean one of ${i.join(", ")}?)`:i.length===1?`
L14: (Did you mean ${i[0]}?)`:""}Jr.suggestSimilar=zu});var Zr=Re(Qi=>{var Yu=require("node:events").EventEmitter,Pi=require("node:child_process"),et=require("node:path"),Ko=require("no...
L15: - specify the name in Command constructor or using .name()`);ret
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L113(Did you mean one of ${i.join(", ")}?)`:i.length===1?`
L14: (Did you mean ${i[0]}?)`:""}Jr.suggestSimilar=zu});var Zr=Re(Qi=>{var Yu=require("node:events").EventEmitter,Pi=require("node:child_process"),et=require("node:path"),Ko=require("no...
L15: - specify the name in Command constructor or using .name()`);return o=o||{},o.isDefault&&(this._defaultCommandName=t._name),(o.noHelp||o.hidden)&&(t._hidden=!0),this._registerComma...
...
L26: Expecting one of '${i.join("', '")}'`);let r=`${t}Help`;return this.on(r,n=>{let s;typeof o=="function"?s=o({error:n.error,command:n.command}):s=o,s&&n.write(`${s}
L27: `)}),this}_outputHelpIfRequested(t){let o=this._getHelpOption();o&&t.find(r=>o.is(r))&&(this.outputHelp(),this._exit(0,"commander.helpDisplayed","(outputHelp)"))}};function Xr(e){r...
Findings
3 Critical5 High4 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.cjs
HighChild Processdist/cli.cjs
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.cjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.cjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.cjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.cjs
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to resend-cli@2.21.0.
See all versions of resend-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of resend-cli@2.21.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.