registry / resend-cli / 2.22.0
resend-cli@2.22.0
The official CLI for Resend
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic review shows a normal official CLI: install does not run code, and credentials are sent to the Resend API the caller configured. Opt-out command telemetry and bundled skill docs are product behavior, not a hidden attack.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The user runs the resend binary; nothing executes on npm install.
Impact
No unconsented credential theft, remote payload execution, persistence, or agent-control mutation was found.
Mechanism
Commands authenticate to the Resend API using a caller-supplied key or stored profile, and optional telemetry sends command names only after an opt-out check.
AI rationale
Static review shows a normal official CLI: install does not run code, and credentials are sent to the Resend API the caller configured. Opt-out command telemetry and bundled skill docs are product behavior, not a hidden attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 86.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json only exposes a user-invoked bin (resend -> dist/cli.cjs) and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall scripts.
- The bundled client defaults API requests to https://api.resend.com, with RESEND_BASE_URL as an operator override.
- Usage telemetry is disabled by DO_NOT_TRACK or RESEND_TELEMETRY_DISABLED and records command metadata, not the user API key.
- Authentication reads a caller-supplied RESEND_API_KEY, a flag, or local stored credentials for Resend API calls.
Evidence against
- A detached telemetry flush posts anonymous cli.used events to PostHog when the user has not opted out.
- skills/resend-cli is packaged agent documentation and is not written into a foreign agent directory at install time.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsMinifiedTelemetry
Source & flagged code
10 flaggeddist/cli.cjsView file
1Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L1: #!/usr/bin/env node
L2: "use strict";var Qu=Object.create;var ki=Object.defineProperty;var Nu=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var Mu=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var qu=Object.getPrototypeOf,Lu=Object.proto...
L3: `)}displayWidth(t){return Vr(t).length}styleTitle(t){return t}styleUsage(t){return t.split(" ").map(o=>o==="[options]"?this.styleOptionText(o):o==="[command]"?this.styleSubcommandT...
...
L13: (Did you mean one of ${i.join(", ")}?)`:i.length===1?`
L14: (Did you mean ${i[0]}?)`:""}Yr.suggestSimilar=em});var on=Re(Ni=>{var tm=require("node:events").EventEmitter,$i=require("node:child_process"),tt=require("node:path"),ko=require("no...
L15: - specify the name in Command constructor or using .name()`);ret
Critical
Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.
dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L113(Did you mean one of ${i.join(", ")}?)`:i.length===1?`
L14: (Did you mean ${i[0]}?)`:""}Yr.suggestSimilar=em});var on=Re(Ni=>{var tm=require("node:events").EventEmitter,$i=require("node:child_process"),tt=require("node:path"),ko=require("no...
L15: - specify the name in Command constructor or using .name()`);return o=o||{},o.isDefault&&(this._defaultCommandName=t._name),(o.noHelp||o.hidden)&&(t._hidden=!0),this._registerComma...
...
L26: Expecting one of '${i.join("', '")}'`);let r=`${t}Help`;return this.on(r,n=>{let s;typeof o=="function"?s=o({error:n.error,command:n.command}):s=o,s&&n.write(`${s}
L27: `)}),this}_outputHelpIfRequested(t){let o=this._getHelpOption();o&&t.find(r=>o.is(r))&&(this.outputHelp(),this._exit(0,"commander.helpDisplayed","(outputHelp)"))}};function tn(e){r...
Findings
3 Critical5 High5 Medium5 Low
CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
CriticalCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/cli.cjs
HighChild Processdist/cli.cjs
HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.cjs
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/cli.cjs
HighTrigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.cjs
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/cli.cjs
MediumDynamic Requiredist/cli.cjs
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumInstall Persistencedist/cli.cjs
Medium
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to resend-cli@2.22.0.
See all versions of resend-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of resend-cli@2.22.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.