runlot@0.1.0-rc.132
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection did not substantiate the scanner's claims of credential exfiltration or remote code execution. Credential lookup is origin-scoped, and the inspected MCP setup is user-invoked guidance rather than an automatic configuration write.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The executable is a user-invoked CLI; the manifest declares no lifecycle hook.
- Saved credentials are selected by API origin, and MCP setup prints instructions only when explicitly invoked.
- The inspected agent configuration location is part of MCP setup guidance, not an automatic configuration write.
- Telemetry can be disabled and targets a Sentry endpoint; inspected code redacts secret-like text and private host data.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.132.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.132 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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