runlot@0.1.0-rc.136
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source supports a clean verdict: the package has no install lifecycle hook, and its MCP setup is user-directed. Saved credentials are matched to the selected API origin; no credential exfiltration or agent-control mutation was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes a CLI entrypoint and has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook.
- The flagged agent-configuration code describes MCP config paths and prints configuration for a user to add; it does not write those files.
- Saved credentials are selected by matching the API origin, and the MCP command requires a token before starting.
- The MCP server supports a caller-selected API URL, but saved credentials are origin-bound and RUNLOT_TOKEN is explicitly supplied through the client environment.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.136.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.136 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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