runlot@0.1.0-rc.137
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe inspected source does not substantiate the scanner’s claims of credential exfiltration or remote response execution. The agent configuration path is user-directed setup, and credentials are scoped to the selected API origin.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest exposes the CLI through dist/index.js and declares no install lifecycle hook.
- The flagged agent configuration location only identifies a Cursor MCP configuration path; the install subcommand prints suggested configuration rather than writing it.
- Credentials are selected by API origin, and the MCP server uses the selected API URL for its bearer token.
- Crash telemetry has an opt-out and sends to the package’s Sentry endpoint.
- The bundled CLI includes environment access, network requests, dynamic loading references, and native runtime files, but inspected paths did not establish credential theft or remote code execution.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.137.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.137 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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