runlot@0.1.0-rc.79
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspection of package.json and the bundled CLI shows ordinary user-invoked deploy, auth, and database behavior with no install hook. Tokens are selected by API origin, and crash reporting is gated and not an install-time exfiltration path.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.
Trigger
A user runs the runlot bin after install.
Impact
No unconsented credential theft, remote payload execution, or agent control-surface mutation was found.
Mechanism
Commands talk to the configured Runlot API, local git or psql, and optional opt-out crash reporting. Tokens stay bound to the saved API origin.
AI rationale
Inspection of package.json and the bundled CLI shows ordinary user-invoked deploy, auth, and database behavior with no install hook. Tokens are selected by API origin, and crash reporting is gated and not an install-time exfiltration path.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 84.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- package.json publishes a CLI bin at dist/index.js and only build, test, and typecheck scripts, with no install lifecycle hooks.
- The CLI loads a saved token only for the matching API origin and sends it as Authorization to that base URL.
- Crash telemetry is off when RUNLOT_TELEMETRY is 0, false, or off, or when DO_NOT_TRACK is 1, and runs only after a CLI crash.
Evidence against
- esbuild, git, and psql are invoked only for user deploy, remote, and database commands.
- A public SSH key is read only when the user runs a repo key command.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
5 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
6245import { existsSync as existsSync3, readFileSync as readFileSync6 } from "node:fs";
L6246: import { spawnSync as spawnSync3 } from "node:child_process";
L6247: import { createInterface } from "node:readline/promises";
High
346"use strict";
L347: var bufferFrom = Buffer.from || Buffer;
L348: module.exports = function parseBytea(input) {
...
L766: if (!isUTC) {
L767: result.setTime(result.getTime() + result.getTimezoneOffset() * 6e4);
L768: }
...
L973: try {
L974: user = process.platform === "win32" ? process.env.USERNAME : process.env.USER;
L975: } catch {
...
L996: binary: false,
L997: // Connection pool options - see https://github.com/brianc/node-pg-pool
L998: // number of connections to use in connection pool
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L3462import { createRequire as __runlotCreateRequire } from "node:module";
L3: const require = __runlotCreateRequire(import.meta.url);
L4: var __create = Object.create;
Medium
Findings
2 High3 Medium7 Low
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
LowSuspicious Lifecycle Evidencepackage.json
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.79.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.79 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.