runlot@0.1.0-rc.87
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install lifecycle hook, and the reviewed agent configuration location is used to print a user-applied setup snippet. Credential lookup binds saved credentials to the selected API origin.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user runs the CLI, including the explicit MCP command.
Impact
No unconsented installation-time mutation, credential export, or malicious persistence was established.
Mechanism
The package starts a standard-input/output MCP server when requested; its install subcommand only writes setup text to standard output.
AI rationale
The package has no install lifecycle hook, and the reviewed agent configuration location is used to print a user-applied setup snippet. Credential lookup binds saved credentials to the selected API origin.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI binary and lists only build, test, and typecheck scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The identified agent configuration code only selects paths and constructs an MCP server snippet.
- The explicit MCP install subcommand prints that snippet and returns without writing configuration.
- Saved credentials are selected by matching API origin; an environment token is explicitly supplied.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
10 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
44function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L928: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L929: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L930: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4444function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L928: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L929: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L930: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
3 Critical5 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.87.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.87 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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