runlot@0.1.0-rc.93
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found a CLI with explicit, output-only MCP setup guidance and origin-bound saved credentials. No install-time execution or concrete malicious behavior was identified.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
An explicit user invocation of the MCP install command.
Impact
No confirmed unconsented configuration change, credential export, or malicious impact was established.
Mechanism
The command prints configuration guidance; it does not write agent configuration.
AI rationale
Static inspection found a CLI with explicit, output-only MCP setup guidance and origin-bound saved credentials. No install-time execution or concrete malicious behavior was identified.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 95.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI binary from the distribution directory.
- The agent-integration code identifies configuration locations but does not modify them.
- The MCP install subcommand only prints setup text after an explicit command.
- Stored credentials are selected by the requested API origin.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
10 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
44function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L928: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L929: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L930: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4444function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L928: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L929: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L930: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
3 Critical5 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.93.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.93 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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