runlot@0.1.0-rc.95
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found no malicious behavior. The required agent-integration location is reached through an explicit command that prints guidance rather than modifying configuration.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
The MCP setup output requires an explicit runlot mcp install command.
Impact
No unconsented configuration mutation, credential export, or install-time execution was established.
Mechanism
The command prints a configuration snippet; saved credentials are selected by API origin.
AI rationale
Static inspection found no malicious behavior. The required agent-integration location is reached through an explicit command that prints guidance rather than modifying configuration.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 96.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest exposes a CLI and lists only build, test, and type-check scripts; it has no install lifecycle hook.
- The inspected agent-integration location only returns configuration-file paths and setup guidance.
- The explicit mcp install subcommand prints setup text; it does not write agent configuration.
- Saved credentials are selected by matching API origin before reuse.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
10 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
44function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L939: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L940: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L941: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4444function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L939: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L940: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L941: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
3 Critical5 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.95.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.95 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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