runlot@0.1.0-rc.96
runlot CLI — deploy apps and manage PostgreSQL
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiStatic inspection found no lifecycle execution or automatic agent configuration write. The flagged MCP configuration behavior is user-invoked guidance, with origin-bound stored credentials.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A user explicitly runs the CLI MCP command.
Impact
No unconsented install-time mutation, credential export, or agent-control hijack was identified.
Mechanism
The install subcommand emits text; the server uses the selected API origin and an available token only when started.
AI rationale
Static inspection found no lifecycle execution or automatic agent configuration write. The flagged MCP configuration behavior is user-invoked guidance, with origin-bound stored credentials.
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 94.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- Package metadata exposes a CLI binary and contains no install lifecycle hook.
- The flagged agent-integration code only identifies configuration-file locations.
- The MCP install subcommand prints setup text and returns without writing configuration.
- Stored credentials are selected by matching API origin, and the MCP server requires an explicit invocation and token.
Evidence against
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
10 flaggeddist/index.jsView file
44function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L939: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L940: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L941: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Credential Exfiltration
Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4444function gitQuery(ref, path) {
L45: const q = new URLSearchParams();
L46: if (ref !== "") q.set("ref", ref);
...
L87: async request(method, path, init) {
L88: const res = await fetch(new URL(path, this.opts.baseUrl), {
L89: ...init,
...
L95: try {
L96: body = await res.json();
L97: } catch {
...
L939: * hostname (the original request went there), and the server derives the org
L940: * and project names from it. Doing `location.replace` with the `redirect` that
L941: * comes back is the caller's job.
Critical
Remote Response Code Execution
Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L44Findings
3 Critical5 High4 Medium6 Low
CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
CriticalRemote Response Code Executiondist/index.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/index.js
HighChild Processdist/index.js
HighEvaldist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/index.js
MediumDynamic Requiredist/index.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to runlot@0.1.0-rc.96.
See all versions of runlot for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of runlot@0.1.0-rc.96 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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