registry / ruvnet-brain / 2.4.1

ruvnet-brain@2.4.1

One-command installer for RuvNet Brain — a portable, source-grounded brain over rUv's RuvNet building blocks, delivered as a Claude Code plugin so Claude uses the stack instead of fighting it.

Static Scan Results

scanned 2h ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 15 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsObfuscatedUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 7 file(s), 142 KB of source, external domains: api.github.com, github.com, nodejs.org, ruvnet-brain.vercel.app, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

bin/install.mjsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/install.mjs — the one-command installer for RuvNet Brain.

3//

4// npx ruvnet-brain # published on npm — shortest, recommended

5// npx github:stuinfla/ruvnet-brain # always the latest commit, even ahead of the npm release

6// node bin/install.mjs --local # from a repo clone that already has dist/ruvnet-brain.zip

7//

8// Goal: a newcomer runs ONE command and ends up with (a) the brain on disk and (b) the Claude Code

9// plugin wired at user scope — narrating "what I'm doing and why" at every step (the product's ethos).

10//

11// Design rules: dependency-free (Node built-ins + shelling to unzip/npm/claude only), idempotent

12// (safe to re-run), and never a silent half-state (every failure explains the next step).

14import https from 'node:https';

15import fs from 'node:fs';

16import os from 'node:os';

17import path from 'node:path';

18import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

19import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L17

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

20import readline from 'node:readline';

21import crypto from 'node:crypto';

23// SEC-0010 #6 — the Ed25519 PUBLIC key is EMBEDDED here (not a separate file) so the installer's

24// trust root travels with the installer code itself: an attacker who swaps the downloaded bundle

25// cannot also swap the key the installer checks it against. Rotate via `node scripts/sign-bundle.mjs

26// --gen-key` and paste the new keys/…pub.pem here. Verify logic mirrors scripts/verify-bundle.mjs.

27const SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM = `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

28MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAgse9TAtehXUvUfTrJFY2CCHiCbmelR8yCgS//sen5/w=

29-----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;

30function verifyBundle(bundlePath, sigPath) {

31 try {

32 if (!fs.existsSync(bundlePath)) return { ok: false, reason: `bundle not found: ${bundlePath}` };

33 if (!fs.existsSync(sigPath)) return { ok: false, reason: `signature missing (fail-closed)` };

34 const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(bundlePath)).digest('hex');

35 const pub = crypto.createPublicKey(SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM);

36 const ok = crypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(digest, 'hex'), pub, fs.readFileSync(sigPath));

37 return ok ? { ok: true, reason: `signature valid (sha256 ${digest.slice(0, 12)}…)` } : { ok: false, reason: 'signature does NOT match — bundle may be tampered' };

Lines 109-149javascript

109// and --demo alike, so every entry point identifies itself the same way.

110function printBanner(subtitle) {

111 const line = '─'.repeat(64);

112 console.log(`\n${c.cyan(line)}`);

113 console.log(

Lines 538-578javascript

538// ── END GENERATED ──

539

540// The verifier belongs next to the data it verifies, so it lives in the KB. But every bundle

541// published before 2026-07-09 predates it, and telling those users "grounding not verifiable —

542// re-run the installer" would send them in a circle, because re-running fetches the same bundle.

543// So the installer CARRIES the verifier and writes it in when it's missing. A newer bundle's copy

544// always wins: we never overwrite a file the bundle shipped.

545function ensureVerifier(cacheDir) {

546 const p = path.join(cacheDir, 'verify-citation.mjs'

scripts/route-cheap.mjsView file

Lines 87-127javascript

87 if (k === '--task' || k === '--model' || k === '--agent' || k === '--class') args[k.slice(2)] = argv[++i];

88 }

89 return args;

scripts/codex-routed.shView file

•path = scripts/codex-routed.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1815 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/codex-routed.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

bin/install.mjsView file

17import path from 'node:path'; L18: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L19: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L17

129// fails with ENOENT even when the command works fine in any real terminal. shell:true routes the L130: // call through cmd.exe, which resolves .cmd shims the same way an interactive shell would. L131: const IS_WIN = process.platform === 'win32';

High

Shell

Package source references shell execution.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L129

10// L11: // Design rules: dependency-free (Node built-ins + shelling to unzip/npm/claude only), idempotent L12: // (safe to re-run), and never a silent half-state (every failure explains the next step). L13: L14: import https from 'node:https'; L15: import fs from 'node:fs'; ... L17: import path from 'node:path'; L18: import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; L19: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; ... L40: L41: const __dirname = path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)); L42: const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..');

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

558if (!fs.existsSync(p)) return null; L559: try { return await import(pathToFileURL(p).href); } catch { return null; } L560: }

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L558

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

scripts/route-cheap.mjsView file

107const started = Date.now(); L108: const run = spawnSync('npx', ['agentic-flow@latest', '--agent', args.agent, '--model', args.model, '--task', args.task], { L109: encoding: 'utf8',

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

scripts/route-cheap.mjsView on unpkg · L107

scripts/codex-routed.shView file

•path = scripts/codex-routed.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1815 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/codex-routed.shView on unpkg

Findings

4 High6 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processbin/install.mjs

HighShellbin/install.mjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/install.mjs

HighRuntime Package Installscripts/route-cheap.mjs

MediumDynamic Requirebin/install.mjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumInstall Persistencebin/install.mjs

MediumShips Build Helperscripts/codex-routed.sh

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowObfuscated

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

bin/install.mjsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/install.mjs — the one-command installer for RuvNet Brain.

3//

4// npx ruvnet-brain # published on npm — shortest, recommended

5// npx github:stuinfla/ruvnet-brain # always the latest commit, even ahead of the npm release

6// node bin/install.mjs --local # from a repo clone that already has dist/ruvnet-brain.zip

7//

8// Goal: a newcomer runs ONE command and ends up with (a) the brain on disk and (b) the Claude Code

9// plugin wired at user scope — narrating "what I'm doing and why" at every step (the product's ethos).

10//

11// Design rules: dependency-free (Node built-ins + shelling to unzip/npm/claude only), idempotent

12// (safe to re-run), and never a silent half-state (every failure explains the next step).

14import https from 'node:https';

15import fs from 'node:fs';

16import os from 'node:os';

17import path from 'node:path';

18import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

19import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L17

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

20import readline from 'node:readline';

21import crypto from 'node:crypto';

23// SEC-0010 #6 — the Ed25519 PUBLIC key is EMBEDDED here (not a separate file) so the installer's

24// trust root travels with the installer code itself: an attacker who swaps the downloaded bundle

25// cannot also swap the key the installer checks it against. Rotate via `node scripts/sign-bundle.mjs

26// --gen-key` and paste the new keys/…pub.pem here. Verify logic mirrors scripts/verify-bundle.mjs.

27const SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM = `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

28MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAgse9TAtehXUvUfTrJFY2CCHiCbmelR8yCgS//sen5/w=

29-----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;

30function verifyBundle(bundlePath, sigPath) {

31 try {

32 if (!fs.existsSync(bundlePath)) return { ok: false, reason: `bundle not found: ${bundlePath}` };

33 if (!fs.existsSync(sigPath)) return { ok: false, reason: `signature missing (fail-closed)` };

34 const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(bundlePath)).digest('hex');

35 const pub = crypto.createPublicKey(SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM);

36 const ok = crypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(digest, 'hex'), pub, fs.readFileSync(sigPath));

37 return ok ? { ok: true, reason: `signature valid (sha256 ${digest.slice(0, 12)}…)` } : { ok: false, reason: 'signature does NOT match — bundle may be tampered' };

Lines 109-149javascript

109// and --demo alike, so every entry point identifies itself the same way.

110function printBanner(subtitle) {

111 const line = '─'.repeat(64);

112 console.log(`\n${c.cyan(line)}`);

113 console.log(

Lines 538-578javascript

538// ── END GENERATED ──

539

540// The verifier belongs next to the data it verifies, so it lives in the KB. But every bundle

541// published before 2026-07-09 predates it, and telling those users "grounding not verifiable —

542// re-run the installer" would send them in a circle, because re-running fetches the same bundle.

543// So the installer CARRIES the verifier and writes it in when it's missing. A newer bundle's copy

544// always wins: we never overwrite a file the bundle shipped.

545function ensureVerifier(cacheDir) {

546 const p = path.join(cacheDir, 'verify-citation.mjs'

scripts/route-cheap.mjsView file

Lines 87-127javascript

87 if (k === '--task' || k === '--model' || k === '--agent' || k === '--class') args[k.slice(2)] = argv[++i];

88 }

89 return args;

scripts/codex-routed.shView file

•path = scripts/codex-routed.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1815 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/codex-routed.shView on unpkg