registry / ruvnet-brain / 3.4.9-dev

ruvnet-brain@3.4.9-dev

One-command installer for RuvNet Brain — a portable, source-grounded brain over rUv's RuvNet building blocks, delivered as a Claude Code plugin so Claude uses the stack instead of fighting it.

Static Scan Results

scanned 2h ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 14 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 13 file(s), 212 KB of source, external domains: api.github.com, code.claude.com, github.com, nodejs.org, ntfy.sh, ruvnet-brain.vercel.app, www.apple.com

Source & flagged code

7 flagged

bin/install.mjsView file

Lines 1-37javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// bin/install.mjs — the one-command installer for RuvNet Brain.

3//

4// npx ruvnet-brain # published on npm — shortest, recommended

5// npx github:stuinfla/ruvnet-brain # always the latest commit, even ahead of the npm release

6// node bin/install.mjs --local # from a repo clone that already has dist/ruvnet-brain.zip

7//

8// Goal: a newcomer runs ONE command and ends up with (a) the brain on disk and (b) the Claude Code

9// plugin wired at user scope — narrating "what I'm doing and why" at every step (the product's ethos).

10//

11// Design rules: dependency-free (Node built-ins + shelling to unzip/npm/claude only), idempotent

12// (safe to re-run), and never a silent half-state (every failure explains the next step).

14import https from 'node:https';

15import fs from 'node:fs';

16import os from 'node:os';

17import path from 'node:path';

18import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

19import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url';

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L17

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

bin/install.mjsView on unpkg · L10

20import readline from 'node:readline';

21import crypto from 'node:crypto';

23// SEC-0010 #6 — the Ed25519 PUBLIC key is EMBEDDED here (not a separate file) so the installer's

24// trust root travels with the installer code itself: an attacker who swaps the downloaded bundle

25// cannot also swap the key the installer checks it against. Rotate via `node scripts/sign-bundle.mjs

26// --gen-key` and paste the new keys/…pub.pem here. Verify logic mirrors scripts/verify-bundle.mjs.

27const SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM = `-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----

28MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAgse9TAtehXUvUfTrJFY2CCHiCbmelR8yCgS//sen5/w=

29-----END PUBLIC KEY-----`;

30function verifyBundle(bundlePath, sigPath) {

31 try {

32 if (!fs.existsSync(bundlePath)) return { ok: false, reason: `bundle not found: ${bundlePath}` };

33 if (!fs.existsSync(sigPath)) return { ok: false, reason: `signature missing (fail-closed)` };

34 const digest = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(fs.readFileSync(bundlePath)).digest('hex');

35 const pub = crypto.createPublicKey(SIGNING_PUBKEY_PEM);

36 const ok = crypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(digest, 'hex'), pub, fs.readFileSync(sigPath));

37 return ok ? { ok: true, reason: `signature valid (sha256 ${digest.slice(0, 12)}…)` } : { ok: false, reason: 'signature does NOT match — bundle may be tampered' };

Lines 112-152javascript

112// and --demo alike, so every entry point identifies itself the same way.

113function printBanner(subtitle) {

114 const line = '─'.repeat(64);

115 console.log(`\n${c.

Lines 541-581javascript

541// ── END GENERATED ──

542

543// The verifier belongs next to the data it verifies, so it lives in the KB. But every bundle

544// published before 2026-07-09 predates it, and telling those users "grounding not verifiable —

545// re-run the installer" would send them in a circle, because re-running fetches the same bundle.

546// So the installer CARRIES the verifier and writes it in when it's missing. A newer bundle's copy

547// always wins: we never overwrite a file the bundle shipped.

548function ensureVerifier(cacheDir) {

549 const p

scripts/falsify.mjsView file

Lines 151-191javascript

151 id: 'does-memory-actually-recall',

152 asked: '"Is AgentDB actually storing AND recalling, or is it just small bits?"',

153 why: 'I reported AgentDB as broken THREE times. It was never broken. I called `memory search` positionally when the CLI wants -q, then broke my own canary test with a bad grep, and reported MY test defects as PRODUCT defects. This check does the round trip so I can never again mistake my own sloppiness for a broken tool.',

154 run: () => {

scripts/codex-routed.shView file

•path = scripts/codex-routed.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 1815 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Build Helper

Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.

scripts/codex-routed.shView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

7 flagged · loading source

bin/install.mjsView file

Static Scan Results

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code