registry / Data exfiltration / ryugi-artifacts / 1.13.0

ryugi-artifacts@1.13.0

Server and viewer for the Ryugi artifacts app

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The login path enables global artifact uploads while bypassing the viewer's explicit opt-in prompt. This establishes unconsented data transfer, so the package should be blocked.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user starts the CLI and signs in; after an agent changes a tracked artifact, it submits the local flush request.

Impact

Artifact contents are synced to the cloud without the user being shown the package's explicit auto-publish choice.

Mechanism

The login callback sets the global auto-publish setting to true. That prevents the opt-in prompt from appearing, and the agent flush processes changed artifacts for upload.

Attack narrative

After cloud sign-in, the server turns on global auto-publishing if the user has not chosen a setting. The viewer's opt-in prompt appears only when that setting is unset, so this login path suppresses it. When an agent changes a tracked artifact and submits the local flush request, its file contents are uploaded to Ryugi Cloud.

AI rationale

The login path enables global artifact uploads while bypassing the viewer's explicit opt-in prompt. This establishes unconsented data transfer, so the package should be blocked.

Evidence

package.jsonbin/ryugi-artifacts.cjsdist/cli.cjsdist/server.cjsdist/viewer/index.js

Network endpoints1

ryugi.innei.dev

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 90.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

The package exposes a CLI that starts its server when a user runs it.
After successful cloud sign-in, the server enables global auto-publishing when no global setting exists.
The viewer asks whether to enable private auto-publishing, but shows that prompt only while the global setting is unset.
Changed artifacts are queued for publishing; the local agent flush route processes that queue.
The server uploads artifact file bytes to its configured cloud origin, which defaults to Ryugi Cloud.

Evidence against

The sync is described as private and goes to the app's Ryugi Cloud service.
Saved credentials are used only when their saved origin matches the active cloud origin.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinified

Source & flagged code

8 flagged

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView file

2patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 2

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView on unpkg · L2

2patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 2

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.js

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/cli.cjsView file

Lines 6-46javascript

6var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;

7var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;

8var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;

9var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {

10 if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {

11 for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))

12 if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)

13 __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });

14 }

15 return to;

16};

17var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(

18 // If the importer is in node compatibility mode or this is not an ESM

19 // file that has been converted to a CommonJS file using a Babel-

20 // compatible transform (i.e. "__esModule" has not been set), then set

21 // "default" to the CommonJS "module.exports" for node compatibility.

22 isNodeMode || !mod || !mod.__esModule ? __defProp(target, "default", { value: mod, enumerable: true }) : target,

23 mod

24));

26// src/cli/main.ts

27var import_node_child_process3 = require("node:child_process");

28var import_node_util = require("node:util");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L26

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L26

30// src/cli/comment.ts

31var import_node_fs3 = __toESM(require("node:fs"), 1);

33// src/server/agent.ts

34var NAMES = {

35 claude: "Claude Code",

36 "claude-code": "Claude Code",

37 cowork: "Claude Cowork",

38 codex: "Codex",

39 cursor: "Cursor",

40 "cursor-cli": "Cursor",

41 gemini: "Gemini CLI",

42 "gemini-cli": "Gemini CLI",

43 "github-copilot": "GitHub Copilot",

44 "github-copilot-cli": "GitHub Copilot",

45 kilo: "Kilo Code",

46 opencode: "OpenCode",

bin/ryugi-artifacts.cjsView file

Lines 1-3javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2require('../dist/cli.cjs');

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/ryugi-artifacts.cjsView on unpkg · L1

dist/viewer/ku-TR-6OUDTVRD-CGsGxS1P.jsView file

Lines 1-9javascript

1import"./prod-CxvgXXgp.js";var e={paste:`دانانەوە`,pasteAsPlaintext:`دایبنێ وەک دەقی سادە`,pasteCharts:`دانانەوەی خشتەکان`,selectAll:`دیاریکردنی هەموو`,multiSelect:`زیادکردنی بۆ دیاریکراوەکان`,moveCanvas:`تابلۆ بجوڵێنە`,cut:`بڕین`,copy:`لەبەرگرتنەوە`,copyAsPng:`PNGلەبەرگرتنەوە بۆ تەختەنووس وەک`,copyAsSvg:`SVGلەبەرگرتنەوە بۆ تەختەنووس وەک`

dist/viewer/DocumentLayout-9ziWsfNL.jsView file

•path = dist/viewer/DocumentLayout-9ziWsfNL.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 7545036 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Oversized Source File

Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling.

dist/viewer/DocumentLayout-9ziWsfNL.jsView on unpkg

dist/cli.cjs#virtual:string-array:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 8

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli.cjs#virtual:string-array:round1View on unpkg

Source & flagged code

8 flagged · loading source

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView file

2patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 2

High

High Secret

Package contains a high-severity secret pattern.

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView on unpkg · L2

2patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 2

High

Secret Pattern

Google API key in dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.js

dist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.jsView on unpkg · L2

dist/cli.cjsView file

26// src/cli/main.ts L27: var import_node_child_process3 = require("node:child_process"); L28: var import_node_util = require("node:util");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/cli.cjsView on unpkg · L26

Findings

1 Critical5 High5 Medium6 Low

CriticalTrojan Source Unicodedist/viewer/ku-TR-6OUDTVRD-CGsGxS1P.js

HighHigh Secretdist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.js

HighChild Processdist/cli.cjs

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.cjs

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.cjs#virtual:string-array:round1

HighSecret Patterndist/viewer/prod-CxvgXXgp.js

MediumDynamic Requirebin/ryugi-artifacts.cjs

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumOversized Source Filedist/viewer/DocumentLayout-9ziWsfNL.js

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to ryugi-artifacts@1.13.0.

See all versions of ryugi-artifacts for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing ryugi-artifacts@1.13.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-21 11:34:50.313Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages

Behavioral surface

Related packages

Other data exfiltration packages

Source & flagged code