sagentic@1.0.2

Production-grade autonomous AI agent platform optimized for Google Cloud Run, Neon pgvector, and Gemini/Cloudflare

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Source inspection found no concrete attack behavior. The scanner’s evaluation and credential-transfer flags correspond to constrained math evaluation and ordinary configured-secret checks; the outbound authentication request is Turnstile verification to Cloudflare.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user launches the CLI or starts the server; the manifest declares no install lifecycle hook.

Impact

No package-controlled credential export, persistence, or destructive action was established.

Mechanism

Authentication compares supplied tokens with configured secrets, and Turnstile verification posts its submitted form to Cloudflare. Calculator input is checked against an arithmetic and Math-member allowlist before evaluation.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/security/auth.jsdist/tools/data-calculator.jsdist/cli.jsdist/server.jsdist/routes/health.js

Network endpoints1

challenges.cloudflare.com

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for AI clean decision

The manifest defines server and CLI entrypoints and no install lifecycle hook.
The calculator restricts expressions to numbers, operators, and named Math members before evaluation.
API tokens are checked against configured AUTH_SECRET or API_SECRET values.
The CLI prompts for a provider key only when none is configured.
Server startup requires DATABASE_URL and a configured AUTH_SECRET; the playground fallback is sent to a same-origin API route.
Turnstile verification sends its form to Cloudflare’s verification endpoint.

Evidence against

The calculator uses new Function, but its input is constrained by the allowlist.
The browser playground has a fixed fallback bearer string; server authentication still checks configured secrets.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStrings

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView file

Lines 1-38javascript

1import { z } from "zod";

2const calculatorSchema = z.object({

3 expression: z

4 .string()

5 .describe('Arithmetic expression to compute, e.g. " (450 * 1.18) - 50 " or "Math.sqrt(144) + 25"'),

6 precision: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).max(10).default(4),

7});

8/**

9 * Evaluates mathematical expressions safely by parsing only numbers, math operators, and Math object methods.

10 * Strictly prohibits any access to process, window, global, require, or prototypes.

11 */

12function safeMathEval(expr) {

13 // Disallow any characters except numbers, whitespace, standard arithmetic operators, parentheses, commas, and Math.* functions

14 const sanitized = expr.replace(/\s+/g, "");

15 if (!/^([0-9\.\+\-\*\/\%\,]|Math\.(abs|acos|asin|atan|ceil|cos|exp|floor|log|max|min

16 throw new Error("Forbidden characters detected in math expression. Only standard arithmetic and Math methods are permitted.");

17 }

18 // Safe Function evaluation with no scope

19 const func = new Function(`return (${sanitized});`);

20 const result = func();

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView on unpkg · L18

21 if (typeof result !== "number" || isNaN(result)) {

22 throw new Error(`Expression did not evaluate to a valid number: ${expr}`);

23 }

24 return result;

25}

26export const dataCalculatorTool = {

27 name: "data_calculator",

28 description: "Safely calculates mathematical expressions, arithmetic, percentages, and scientific formulas with guaranteed precision.",

29 parameters: calculatorSchema,

30 execute: async ({ expression, precision }) => {

31 try {

32 const rawResult = safeMathEval(expression);

33 const rounded = Number(rawResult.toFixed(precision));

34 return {

35 expression,

36 result: rounded,

37 rawResult,

38 };

dist/security/auth.jsView file

Lines 1-29javascript

1import crypto from "crypto";

2import { env } from "../config/env.js";

3/**

4 * Constant-time string equality check to prevent side-channel timing attacks.

5 */

6export function safeEqual(

dist/cli.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView file

18// Safe Function evaluation with no scope L19: const func = new Function(`return (${sanitized});`); L20: const result = func();

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView on unpkg · L18

dist/security/auth.jsView file

9} L10: const bufA = Buffer.from(a); L11: const bufB = Buffer.from(b); ... L30: !safeEqual(originSecretHeader, env.ORIGIN_SECRET)) { L31: reply.status(403).send({ L32: statusCode: 403, ... L62: : false; L63: const matchesApiSecret = process.env.API_SECRET L64: ? safeEqual(token, process.env.API_SECRET) ... L89: } L90: const res = await fetch("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/siteverify", { L91: method: "POST",

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/security/auth.jsView on unpkg · L9

9Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/server.js -> dist/routes/agent.js -> dist/security/auth.js L9: } L10: const bufA = Buffer.from(a); L11: const bufB = Buffer.from(b); ... L30: !safeEqual(originSecretHeader, env.ORIGIN_SECRET)) { L31: reply.status(403).send({ L32: statusCode: 403, ... L62: : false; L63: const matchesApiSecret = process.env.API_SECRET L64: ? safeEqual(token, process.env.API_SECRET) ... L89: } L90: const res = await fetch("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/siteverify", { L91: method: "POST",

Findings

2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/security/auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/security/auth.js

HighEvaldist/tools/data-calculator.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/security/auth.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to sagentic@1.0.2.

See all versions of sagentic for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of sagentic@1.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 05:57:14.363Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.