registry / Credential exfiltration / sagentic / 1.0.8

sagentic@1.0.8

Production-grade autonomous AI agent platform optimized for Google Cloud Run, Neon pgvector, and Gemini/Cloudflare

AI Security Review

scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The CLI's default remote-chat path forwards generic backend secrets without checking that they are intended for the hosted recipient. Because the endpoint appears to serve the package's remote-chat feature, the source supports a warning for unresolved credential exposure rather than a confirmed malicious transfer.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.

Trigger

A user sends a chat message while the CLI is in remote mode, which is the default unless local mode is selected.

Impact

A local backend authentication secret may be disclosed to the hosted service; the source does not establish misuse or recipient-specific consent.

Mechanism

The CLI selects SAGENTIC_API_KEY, AUTH_SECRET, or API_SECRET and sends the selected value in a Bearer authorization header to the remote URL.

AI rationale

Evidence

dist/cli.jsdist/config/env.jsdist/security/auth.js

Network endpoints1

sagentic-ohyotaaora-el.a.run.app/api/v1/agent/chat

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 82.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Remote chat can send AUTH_SECRET or API_SECRET as a bearer token to the CLI's default hosted endpoint.
The default remote path is used unless local mode is selected; the source does not bind these generic secrets to a recipient-specific consent check.
AUTH_SECRET is defined for backend authentication, and the server accepts it as an API key.
The flagged calculator restricts input to numeric, operator, and Math expressions before evaluation.

Evidence against

The CLI is designed to send chat requests to a Sagentic hosted service, so sending an API credential may be part of intended remote authentication.
Local mode avoids the remote chat request, and the endpoint can be overridden.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsEvalFilesystemNetworkShell

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView file

Lines 1-38javascript

1import { z } from "zod";

2const calculatorSchema = z.object({

3 expression: z

4 .string()

5 .describe('Arithmetic expression to compute, e.g. " (450 * 1.18) - 50 " or "Math.sqrt(144) + 25"'),

6 precision: z.coerce.number().int().min(0).max(10).default(4),

7});

8/**

9 * Evaluates mathematical expressions safely by parsing only numbers, math operators, and Math object methods.

10 * Strictly prohibits any access to process, window, global, require, or prototypes.

11 */

12function safeMathEval(expr) {

13 // Disallow any characters except numbers, whitespace, standard arithmetic operators, parentheses, commas, and Math.* functions

14 const sanitized = expr.replace(/\s+/g, "");

15 if (!/^([0-9\.\+\-\*\/\%\,]|Math\.(abs|acos|asin|atan|ceil|cos|exp|floor|log|max|min

16 throw new Error("Forbidden characters detected in math expression. Only standard arithmetic and Math methods are permitted.");

17 }

18 // Safe Function evaluation with no scope

19 const func = new Function(`return (${sanitized});`);

20 const result = func();

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView on unpkg · L18

21 if (typeof result !== "number" || isNaN(result)) {

22 throw new Error(`Expression did not evaluate to a valid number: ${expr}`);

23 }

24 return result;

25}

26export const dataCalculatorTool = {

27 name: "data_calculator",

28 description: "Safely calculates mathematical expressions, arithmetic, percentages, and scientific formulas with guaranteed precision.",

29 parameters: calculatorSchema,

30 execute: async ({ expression, precision }) => {

31 try {

32 const rawResult = safeMathEval(expression);

33 const rounded = Number(rawResult.toFixed(precision));

34 return {

35 expression,

36 result: rounded,

37 rawResult,

38 };

dist/security/auth.jsView file

Lines 1-29javascript

1import crypto from "crypto";

2import { env } from "../config/env.js";

3/**

4 * Constant-time string equality check to prevent side-channel timing attacks.

5 */

6export function safeEqual(

dist/cli.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView file

18// Safe Function evaluation with no scope L19: const func = new Function(`return (${sanitized});`); L20: const result = func();

High

Eval

Package source references dynamic code evaluation.

dist/tools/data-calculator.jsView on unpkg · L18

dist/security/auth.jsView file

9} L10: const bufA = Buffer.from(a); L11: const bufB = Buffer.from(b); ... L30: !safeEqual(originSecretHeader, env.ORIGIN_SECRET)) { L31: reply.status(403).send({ L32: statusCode: 403, ... L62: : false; L63: const matchesApiSecret = process.env.API_SECRET L64: ? safeEqual(token, process.env.API_SECRET) ... L121: } L122: const res = await fetch("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/siteverify", { L123: method: "POST",

Critical

Credential Exfiltration

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

dist/security/auth.jsView on unpkg · L9

9Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/server.js -> dist/routes/agent.js -> dist/security/auth.js L9: } L10: const bufA = Buffer.from(a); L11: const bufB = Buffer.from(b); ... L30: !safeEqual(originSecretHeader, env.ORIGIN_SECRET)) { L31: reply.status(403).send({ L32: statusCode: 403, ... L62: : false; L63: const matchesApiSecret = process.env.API_SECRET L64: ? safeEqual(token, process.env.API_SECRET) ... L121: } L122: const res = await fetch("https://challenges.cloudflare.com/turnstile/v0/siteverify", { L123: method: "POST",

Findings

2 Critical3 High3 Medium4 Low

CriticalCredential Exfiltrationdist/security/auth.js

CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/security/auth.js

HighEvaldist/tools/data-calculator.js

HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/security/auth.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to sagentic@1.0.8.

See all versions of sagentic for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of sagentic@1.0.8 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-20 05:56:09.115Z (UTC).

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