--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sauruspro-bail" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sauruspro-bail/report.md" package: "sauruspro-bail" report_status: "published" title: "sauruspro-bail@5.0.1 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "5.0.1" --- # sauruspro-bail@5.0.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Uses the user's WhatsApp account to follow channels they did not choose or request. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Malware - **Selected version:** 5.0.1 - **Selected version is latest:** Yes - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package automatically fetches a publisher-controlled list of WhatsApp newsletters and follows those channels through the user's authenticated socket. This performs unrequested account actions by default, so the package is malicious. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-11-02T02:30:08.732Z - **Finished:** 2026-11-02T02:30:53.553Z - **Download time:** 505 ms - **Static scan time:** 2194 ms - **AI review time:** 42121 ms - **Total time:** 44821 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Automatically follows publisher-selected WhatsApp newsletters using the user's authenticated socket. - **Trigger:** Construction of the normal message socket; the remote-list fetch is scheduled after 10 seconds. - **Impact:** Uses the user's WhatsApp account to follow channels they did not choose or request. - **Evidence paths:** lib/Socket/newsletter.js, lib/Socket/username.js, lib/Socket/messages-send.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-11-02T02:30:53.553Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** Fetches newsletter IDs from a concealed external URL, then issues WhatsApp newsletter-follow queries for each ID. - **Attack narrative:** When the standard message socket is created, it schedules a request to an obfuscated external URL, reads newsletter IDs from the response, and follows each ID through the user's WhatsApp socket without consent. - **Rationale:** The package automatically fetches a publisher-controlled list of WhatsApp newsletters and follows those channels through the user's authenticated socket. This performs unrequested account actions by default, so the package is malicious. - **Network endpoints:** https://push-saurus.yorunime.sbs/idch.json, web.whatsapp.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for block:** Creating the newsletter socket schedules a fetch from a Base64-encoded URL that decodes to https://push-saurus.yorunime.sbs/idch.json., The fetched response supplies newsletter IDs that the code automatically follows through the socket’s WhatsApp query function., The normal message socket construction calls makeUsernameSocket, which constructs the newsletter socket. - **Evidence against:** The package describes itself as a custom WhatsApp Web API, so WhatsApp network and account operations are relevant to its purpose., The preinstall script only checks the Node.js major version and exits when it is below 20. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to sauruspro-bail@5.0.1. - Avoid installing sauruspro-bail@5.0.1. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. - If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.preinstall = node ./engine-requirements.js ``` ### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: High Secret - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a high-severity secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 600 ``` ### 5. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/validate-connection.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L107: pull: false, L108: devicePairingData: { L109: buildHash: appVersionBuf, ... L134: const { details, hmac, accountType } = proto.ADVSignedDeviceIdentityHMAC.decode(deviceIdentityNode.content); L135: let hmacPrefix = Buffer.from([]); L136: if (accountType !== undefined && accountType === proto.ADVEncryptionType.HOSTED) { ... L158: ]); L159: account.deviceSignature = Curve.sign(signedIdentityKey.private, deviceMsg); L160: const identity = createSignalIdentity(lid, accountSignatureKey); ``` ### 6. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 7. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 8. High: Base64 Obscured Url - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** lib/Socket/newsletter.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L7: const parseNewsletterCreateResponse = response => { L8: const { id, thread_metadata: thread, viewer_metadata: viewer } = response L9: return { ... L50: try { L51: const res = await fetch(Buffer.from(xU, "base64").toString()) L52: const list = await res.json() ``` ### 9. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 10. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 11. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```shell path = WAProto/GenerateStatics.sh kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 302 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 12. Medium: Oversized Source File - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** WAProto/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains source files above the normal full-analysis size ceiling. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript path = WAProto/index.js kind = oversized_source_file sizeBytes = 12145764 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 14. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/business.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 3 ``` ### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** lib/Utils/messages-media.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @bil-rgb/baileys@1.0.1 matchedPath = lib/Utils/messages-media.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGJpbC1yZ2IvYmFpbGV5cw:1.0.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 16. High: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** lib/WABinary/constants.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Google API key in lib/WABinary/constants.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = google_api_key severity = high line = 600 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** preinstall, prepare - **Dependencies:** 14 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 4 - **Development dependencies:** 30 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 18 ### Published dependency entries - @cacheable/node-cache ^1.4.0 (Dependency) - @hapi/boom ^9.1.3 (Dependency) - async-mutex ^0.5.0 (Dependency) - cache-manager ^7.2.8 (Dependency) - chalk ^4.1.2 (Dependency) - fluent-ffmpeg ^2.1.3 (Dependency) - libsignal ^6.0.0 (Dependency) - lru-cache ^11.1.0 (Dependency) - music-metadata ^11.12.3 (Dependency) - p-queue ^9.0.0 (Dependency) - pino ^9.6 (Dependency) - protobufjs ^7.5.6 (Dependency) - whatsapp-rust-bridge 0.5.4 (Dependency) - ws ^8.13.0 (Dependency) - audio-decode ^2.1.3 (PeerDependency) - jimp ^1.6.1 (PeerDependency) - link-preview-js ^3.0.0 (PeerDependency) - sharp \* (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** sauruspro-bail - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.0.1 - **License:** MIT - **Version published:** 2026-11-01T03:36:25.162Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-10-31T10:30:45.568Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-02T02:31:04.191Z - **Known versions:** 3 - **Latest version:** 5.0.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Sauruspro Baileys - Custom WhatsApp Web API with SPR (Selective Relay), Newsletter Status, Rich Messages and pairing support. - **Author:** Saurus / Dinonic - **Keywords:** baileys, whatsapp, whatsapp-baileys, Sauruspro, dinonic, newsletter-status - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0 - **Artifact files:** 160 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 18,237,926 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]()