sdlc-agent-4-enterprise-server@1.41.1-SA4E-242-release
Code Intelligence MCP Server — multi-agent SDLC pipeline with semantic memory, code graph, and draw.io integration
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiNo automatic install-time attack or credential exfiltration was found, but an inspectable runtime path performs unverified remote shell execution. This is a real dangerous capability despite its explicit environment-variable trigger.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- start.js conditionally downloads and pipes a remote installer directly into a shell without integrity verification.
- The same runtime startup path invokes that remote installer before launching services.
- package.json has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; prepare only exits successfully.
- The published MCP entrypoint starts the code-intelligence server, not start.js.
- The draw.io shell command uses internally generated temporary input and output paths.
- The credential-looking values are detector test fixtures, and the Python normalizer contains only text normalization.
Source & flagged code
30 flagged · loading sourcePackage contains a critical-looking secret pattern.
src/modules/memory/masking/__tests__/CredentialDetector.test.tsView on unpkg · L14GitHub personal access token in src/modules/memory/masking/__tests__/CredentialDetector.test.ts
src/modules/memory/masking/__tests__/CredentialDetector.test.tsView on unpkg · L14Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to sdlc-agent-4-enterprise-server@1.41.1-SA4E-242-release.
See all versions of sdlc-agent-4-enterprise-server for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of sdlc-agent-4-enterprise-server@1.41.1-SA4E-242-release before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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