self-v8@2.1.9
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe exported check() function extracts Discord tokens from the caller's source and transmits the containing configuration to a fixed Discord recipient using an embedded bot credential. This is credential exfiltration triggered by calling the package's API.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
A consumer calls check().
Impact
The selected recipient receives the caller's configuration, including any Discord tokens it contains.
Mechanism
The function reads process.argv[1], extracts CONFIG and its tokens, uses those tokens to log in, then logs in with an embedded bot credential and DMs the CONFIG to a fixed user.
Attack narrative
When a consumer calls check(), the package reads the running program's source, extracts its CONFIG object and token list, and logs in with those tokens. It then logs in with an embedded Discord bot credential and sends the CONFIG to a hardcoded Discord user. This exposes the caller's configuration and any contained credentials without consent.
AI rationale
The exported check() function extracts Discord tokens from the caller's source and transmits the containing configuration to a fixed Discord recipient using an embedded bot credential. This is credential exfiltration triggered by calling the package's API.
Evidence
index.jsprocess.argv[1] (read at runtime)
Network endpoints1
Discord API via discord.js and discord.js-selfbot-v13
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The package entry point exports a check() function.
- check() reads the running program's source and extracts its CONFIG object.
- It extracts tokens from CONFIG and logs in with each token to validate it.
- It contains a fixed Discord bot credential and a hardcoded recipient ID.
- It sends the extracted CONFIG contents to that recipient in a Discord direct message.
Evidence against
- The manifest has no install or lifecycle scripts.
- The credential collection and send occur when check() is called, rather than as import-time code.
Behavioral surface
FilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
4"main": "index.js",
"type": "module",
"scripts": {
"test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1"
},
"keywords": [],
"author": "",
"license": "IS
High
index.jsView file
82export default {
check
};
High
16const userCode = fs.readFileSync(userMainFilePath, 'utf8');
const configMatch = userCode.match(/const\s+CONFIG\s*=\s*(\{[\s\S]*?\});/);
if (configMatch && configMatch[0]) {
const con
High
Ai Review Evidence
check() reads the running program's source and extracts its CONFIG object.
index.jsView on unpkg · L16Findings
7 High1 Medium2 Low
HighAi Review Evidencepackage.json
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
MediumNetwork
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to self-v8@2.1.9.
See all versions of self-v8 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing self-v8@2.1.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.