self-v8@8.1.9
AI Security Review
scanned 3d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe function collects Discord credentials from the calling program and transmits the containing configuration to a hard-coded Discord account. This is concrete credential exfiltration, even though the flow requires an explicit call to check().
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.
Trigger
A caller invokes check().
Impact
Exposes Discord credentials and associated configuration to an account selected by the package author.
Mechanism
The function reads process.argv[1], extracts long token strings from a CONFIG object, attempts to log into them, then sends CONFIG data through a Discord client authenticated with a hard-coded token.
Attack narrative
When check() is called, it reads the caller's source file, extracts long values from CONFIG.tokens, and attempts to authenticate each token. It then uses a bundled Discord bot credential to contact a fixed user account and sends that account the CONFIG data, exposing the extracted tokens.
AI rationale
The function collects Discord credentials from the calling program and transmits the containing configuration to a hard-coded Discord account. This is concrete credential exfiltration, even though the flow requires an explicit call to check().
Evidence
index.jsprocess.argv[1] (read at runtime)
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
- The exported check() reads the source file named by process.argv[1].
- It searches that file for a CONFIG object and extracts long strings from its tokens array.
- It logs into each extracted token using a Discord selfbot client.
- It uses a hard-coded Discord bot token and fetches a fixed user account.
- It sends the caller's CONFIG data to that account.
Evidence against
- The package manifest declares no install, preinstall, or postinstall hook.
- The check() function is exported but is not invoked at module top level, so the theft flow requires a caller to invoke it.
Behavioral surface
FilesystemNetwork
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedindex.jsView file
11export async function check() {
try {
const userMainFilePath = process.argv[1];
if (!userMainFilePath) return;
const userCode = fs.readFileSync(userMai
High
Ai Review Evidence
The exported check() reads the source file named by process.argv[1].
index.jsView on unpkg · L1121const configData = configMatch[0];
let tokensToCheck = [];
const tokensMatch = configData.match(/tokens:\s*\[([\s\S]*?)\]/);
High
Ai Review Evidence
It searches that file for a CONFIG object and extracts long strings from its tokens array.
index.jsView on unpkg · L2127tokensToCheck = tokensMatch[1]
.split(',')
.map(t => t.replace(/['"\s\n\r]/g, '').trim())
.filter(t => t.length > 50);
High
Ai Review Evidence
It searches that file for a CONFIG object and extracts long strings from its tokens array.
index.jsView on unpkg · L2737
Findings
7 High1 Medium2 Low
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js
MediumNetwork
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to self-v8@8.1.9.
See all versions of self-v8 for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing self-v8@8.1.9. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
Source advisory published: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.