shine-worklog@1.4.2

Claude Code Hook -> 本地常驻 Daemon 的状态/持久化底座

AI Security Review

scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The package is a first-party Claude Code extension installer with persistent hooks and default self-updating behavior. These capabilities warrant a warning, but source inspection found no concrete malicious chain.

Static reason

High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

User runs shine-worklog install, then Claude Code invokes the enabled hooks.

Impact

Persistent access to Claude hook payloads and automatic execution of future package versions after opt-in installation.

Mechanism

Claude plugin registration, hook event collection, local daemon, and detached self-update.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsonsrc/install/main.tssrc/install/register.tssrc/shared/updater.tssrc/hook/main.tssrc/shared/config.ts~/.claude/plugins configuration JSON~/.local/share/shine-worklogsrc/daemon/main.ts

Network endpoints3

registry.npmjs.org/shine-worklog/latestregistry.npmjs.org/bun.sh/install

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for warning

Explicit install registers and enables a Claude Code plugin.
Daemon defaults to silent detached updates from npm latest.
Hooks collect Claude event payloads and persist/forward them locally.
Daemon listens on all interfaces by default.

Evidence against

No npm install lifecycle hook executes automatically.
No hard-coded external report receiver; reporting URL is user-configured.
Observed network use is Bun/npm update/install and local daemon traffic.
No source evidence of credential theft or unsolicited data exfiltration.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 103 file(s), 875 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, 47.98.221.20, bun.sh, easy.shine.com.cn, github.com, react.dev, registry.npmjs.org, www.w3.org

Source & flagged code

14 flagged

bin/launcher.cjsView file

Lines 1-31javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// shine-worklog hook 平台分发器（.cjs 强制 CommonJS，兼容所有 node，不依赖 package.json）。

3// Claude Code 经 hooks.json 以 `node launcher.cjs <Event>` 调用（exec form，不经 shell）。

4// 优先 spawn 同目录 bin/<plat>-<arch>/hook[.exe]（二进制模式，本机 build 产物）；

5// 不存在则 bun run src/hook/main.ts（源码模式）。源码模式需要 Bun——若没装，首次自动安装

6// （npm i -g bun → 失败回退官方脚本）。退出码恒 0——绝不影响 Claude Code 主进程。

7//

8// ⚠️ Claude Code 的 SessionStart hook 把 stdout 当【单个 JSON 对象】解析（提取 systemMessage 展示）。

9// 所以:① 进度/提示绝不能写 stdout(混入纯文本会让整个 stdout JSON 解析失败、链接也不显示)——走 stderr + 日志。

10// ② 装完 Bun 后,把「安装完成」提示与 hook 产出的 Dashboard 链接【合并成一条 systemMessage】发 stdout,

11// 确保交互式 claude 里一定能看到(systemMessage 字段已被验证会显示)。

12const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process");

13const readline = require("node:readline");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg · L11

Medium

Dynamic Require

Package source references dynamic require/import behavior.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg · L11

14const { existsSync, mkdirSync, appendFileSync } = require("node:fs");

15const { join } = require("node:path");

16const { homedir } = require("node:os");

18const here = __dirname; // .../bin/

19const plat = process.platform === "win32" ? "windows" : process.platform; // darwin | linux | windows

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg · L1

20const arch = process.arch; // x64 | arm64

21const ext = process.platform === "win32" ? ".exe" : "";

22const hookBin = join(here, `${plat}-${arch}`, `hook${ext}`);

23const hookSrc = join(here, "..", "src", "hook", "main.ts"); // 源码模式入口

25const argv = process.argv.slice(2);

26const event = argv[0];

27const SHELL = process.platform === "win32";

29/** 找 bun：先 PATH，再常见安装位置（官方脚本装到 ~/.bun/bin，npm -g 装到全局 bin）。 */

30function findBun() {

31 // shell 模式用单字符串（避免 Node 的 "args + shell:true" 弃用警告污染 stderr）

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = shine-worklog@1.3.47 matchedPath = bin/launcher.cjs matchedIdentity = npm:c2hpbmUtd29ya2xvZw:1.3.47 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg

src/install/bun.tsView file

Lines 28-68typescript

28}

30function versionGte(v: string, min: number[]): boolean {

31 const parts =

src/shared/id.tsView file

Lines 1-20typescript

1// 稳定事件 id：基于事件内容派生（而非 hook 进程随机生成），用于幂等去重。

2// 同一语义事件即使被多个 hook 进程采集（如 settings.json + plugin 双注册，

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

src/shared/id.tsView on unpkg · L1

3// 或他人全局 hook 与本 plugin 并存），只要 sessionId/type/payload 相同，

4// 派生出的 eventId 就相同，store 的 PRIMARY KEY (session_id, event_id) 即可去重。

5// 不含 timestamp——两个采集进程的时间戳差几十 ms，跨秒边界会让派生值错开而漏去重。

6import { createHash } from "node:crypto";

7import

dist/install.cjsView file

Lines 1-11javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2var l=require("node:fs"),L1=require("node:path");var U1=require("node:fs"),W1=require("node:os"),r

ui/components/SettingsModule.tsxView file

•Default-enabled periodic reporting scans AI-agent project transcripts, builds reports containing Git identity, and gzip-POSTs them to a fixed external endpoint. ui/components/SettingsModule.tsx: reportUrl?: string | null; reportIntervalMin?: number | null; setUrl(s.reportUrl ?? ""); setIntervalStr(s.reportIntervalMin != null ? String(s.reportIntervalMin) : ""); reportUrl: url.trim() || null, reportIntervalMin: Number.isFinite(iv) && iv > 0 ? iv : null, setUrl(s.reportUrl ?? ""); setIntervalStr(s.reportIntervalMin != null ? String(s.reportIntervalMin) : ""); skills/report/scripts/zentao.ts: * config [--url U --account A --password P --projects 1,2] [--show] * check / projects [--limit N] / my-tasks [--projects 1,2] [--all-status] * executions [--projects 1,2] / create-task --execution

Critical

Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

ui/components/SettingsModule.tsxView on unpkg

src/shared/updater.tsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = shine-worklog@1.3.47 matchedPath = src/shared/updater.ts matchedIdentity = npm:c2hpbmUtd29ya2xvZw:1.3.47 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/shared/updater.tsView on unpkg

src/hook/main.tsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = shine-worklog@1.3.47 matchedPath = src/hook/main.ts matchedIdentity = npm:c2hpbmUtd29ya2xvZw:1.3.47 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/hook/main.tsView on unpkg

src/shared/daemonctl.tsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = shine-worklog@1.3.47 matchedPath = src/shared/daemonctl.ts matchedIdentity = npm:c2hpbmUtd29ya2xvZw:1.3.47 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

src/shared/daemonctl.tsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

14 flagged · loading source

bin/launcher.cjsView file

11// 确保交互式 claude 里一定能看到(systemMessage 字段已被验证会显示)。 L12: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process"); L13: const readline = require("node:readline");

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg · L11

1#!/usr/bin/env node L2: // shine-worklog hook 平台分发器（.cjs 强制 CommonJS，兼容所有 node，不依赖 package.json）。 L3: // Claude Code 经 hooks.json 以 `node launcher.cjs <Event>` 调用（exec form，不经 shell）。 ... L7: // L8: // ⚠️ Claude Code 的 SessionStart hook 把 stdout 当【单个 JSON 对象】解析（提取 systemMessage 展示）。 L9: // 所以:① 进度/提示绝不能写 stdout(混入纯文本会让整个 stdout JSON 解析失败、链接也不显示)——走 stderr + 日志。 ... L11: // 确保交互式 claude 里一定能看到(systemMessage 字段已被验证会显示)。 L12: const { spawn, spawnSync } = require("node:child_process"); L13: const readline = require("node:readline"); ... L17: L18: const here = __dirname; // .../bin/ L19: const plat = process.platform === "win32" ? "windows" : process.platform; // darwin | linux | windows

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

bin/launcher.cjsView on unpkg · L1

Findings

1 Critical11 High4 Medium6 Low

CriticalHardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltrationui/components/SettingsModule.tsx

HighChild Processbin/launcher.cjs

HighShellsrc/install/bun.ts

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/install.cjs

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitybin/launcher.cjs

HighExternal Ai Agent Control Surface Mutationdist/install.cjs

HighRuntime Package Installdist/install.cjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritybin/launcher.cjs

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/shared/updater.ts

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/hook/main.ts

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/install/bun.ts

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to shine-worklog@1.4.2.

See all versions of shine-worklog for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of shine-worklog@1.4.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-08-19 04:51:01.236Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Runtime surface

Behavioral surface

Source & flagged code