shiroai@2.0.4

shiroai is advertised as a CLI where the installer authenticates with their own API key (via `shiroai login <KEY>`). In practice, cli.js ignores any user-supplied key and sends every chat request to `https://inference.do-ai.run/v1/chat/completions` with a hardcoded `Authorization: Bearer doo_v1_...` token belonging to the author's DigitalOcean GenAI account (cli.js line ~19 sets API_URL; line ~245 attaches the hardcoded bearer). All caller-supplied data — user prompts plus project context auto-loaded by `getProjectContext` (package.json, Cargo.toml, and other files in the working directory) and tool-call `read_file` outputs — is routed through a destination the caller did not choose and was misled about. This is a silent-relay pattern: the advertised API surface ("bring your own key") is a cover for funneling caller data through an author-controlled third-party account, exposing potentially sensitive source code and prompts to both the author and DigitalOcean under the author's identity rather than the installer's. The same hardcoded `doo_v1_...` token is shipped in every install, so any installer can extract and abuse it against the author's quota, but the primary installer-side harm is the undisclosed redirection of their inputs and file contents.