slashvibe-mcp@0.8.19
Presence + messaging for terminal coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor) — the /vibe kernel
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe onboarding flow silently sends the current repository name and detected technologies to the vendor for a personalized welcome. This is a privacy risk, but the reviewed behavior is limited to onboarding and does not establish credential theft or malicious intent.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
The user invokes `vibe_init` and completes OAuth.
Impact
The vendor receives a project identifier and technology inventory that may reveal sensitive project context.
Mechanism
The package detects the repository name and technology stack, then posts them to the vendor's personalized-welcome endpoint without a separate consent gate.
AI rationale
The onboarding flow silently sends the current repository name and detected technologies to the vendor for a personalized welcome. This is a privacy risk, but the reviewed behavior is limited to onboarding and does not establish credential theft or malicious intent.
Evidence
tools/init.js
Network endpoints1
www.slashvibe.dev/api/onboarding/personalized-welcome
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 84.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- During `vibe_init`, the package detects the current Git repository name and technology stack.
- It sends `repoName` and `techStack` in a POST to `/api/onboarding/personalized-welcome` on `www.slashvibe.dev`.
- The welcome request runs automatically after OAuth succeeds; the source shows no separate consent gate for sending this project metadata.
Evidence against
- The manifest declares no install lifecycle scripts.
- The collection and transmission occur during the explicit sign-in flow, not on package installation or import.
- The welcome request contains project metadata but no authorization token.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedtools/_work-context.jsView file
12L13: const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
L14: const fs = require('fs');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
tools/_work-context.jsView on unpkg · L12tools/init.jsView file
11L12: const { exec, execSync } = require('child_process');
L13: const fs = require('fs');
...
L21:
L22: const API_BASE = 'https://www.slashvibe.dev';
L23:
...
L25: // "vibe email …" advertises a command their session does not have.
L26: const EXTRAS_ENABLED = ['1', 'true'].includes(String(process.env.VIBE_EXTRAS || '').toLowerCase());
L27:
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
tools/init.jsView on unpkg · L11protocol/handle.jsView file
Findings
3 Critical4 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeprotocol/handle.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityprotocol/handle.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltasetup.js
HighChild Processtools/_work-context.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiontools/init.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js#virtual:string-array:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to slashvibe-mcp@0.8.19.
See all versions of slashvibe-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of slashvibe-mcp@0.8.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.