slashvibe-mcp@0.8.20
Presence + messaging for terminal coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor) — the /vibe kernel
AI Security Review
scanned 5d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package sends identifiable project context to its own service during OAuth completion without a separate consent prompt. This is a limited, product-related disclosure rather than credential theft, but it presents a privacy risk and merits a warning.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A user completes the browser sign-in flow started by the init tool.
Impact
The service learns the local repository name and some dependency or technology details without a separate sharing prompt.
Mechanism
The OAuth completion path detects the current repository name and tech stack, then posts them with profile fields to the personalized-welcome API.
AI rationale
The package sends identifiable project context to its own service during OAuth completion without a separate consent prompt. This is a limited, product-related disclosure rather than credential theft, but it presents a privacy risk and merits a warning.
Evidence
tools/init.js
Network endpoints1
www.slashvibe.dev/api/onboarding/personalized-welcome
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 87.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- After sign-in, the personalized-welcome request sends the user's handle and profile text together with their local repository name and detected tech stack to the package's API.
- The request runs from the OAuth callback completion path, without a separate prompt to share project details.
Evidence against
- The package has no install lifecycle scripts, and the inspected setup writes agent configuration only when its setup flow runs.
- The data is sent to the package's own onboarding endpoint for a personalized welcome; this payload does not include the OAuth token.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedtools/_work-context.jsView file
12L13: const { execFileSync } = require('child_process');
L14: const fs = require('fs');
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
tools/_work-context.jsView on unpkg · L12tools/init.jsView file
11L12: const { exec, execSync } = require('child_process');
L13: const fs = require('fs');
...
L21:
L22: const API_BASE = 'https://www.slashvibe.dev';
L23:
...
L25: // "vibe email …" advertises a command their session does not have.
L26: const EXTRAS_ENABLED = ['1', 'true'].includes(String(process.env.VIBE_EXTRAS || '').toLowerCase());
L27:
High
Same File Env Network Execution
A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.
tools/init.jsView on unpkg · L11protocol/handle.jsView file
Findings
3 Critical4 High3 Medium4 Low
CriticalTrojan Source Unicodeprotocol/handle.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilityprotocol/handle.js
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltasetup.js
HighChild Processtools/_work-context.js
HighShell
HighSame File Env Network Executiontools/init.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedindex.js#virtual:string-array:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to slashvibe-mcp@0.8.20.
See all versions of slashvibe-mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of slashvibe-mcp@0.8.20 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.