slaunt@0.1.21
This package contains the client-side one-sign-in OAuth handoff for Codex and Claude Code. Each native client stores its own OAuth credentials; bootstrap credentials stay in CLI memory during setup. The Desktop vault is not used for the native OAuth hando
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe installer’s default hooks transmit prompt and final-reply content to Slaunt’s service, while the README describes the default Codex configuration as metadata-only and chat capture as optional. This is undisclosed runtime collection, so warn rather than block.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
After a user runs `slaunt-hooks install` and uses a configured Codex or Claude client.
Impact
Conversation content, which may contain sensitive user data, leaves the local machine without clear disclosure in the package documentation.
Mechanism
Installed hooks capture prompt and final-reply content and forward it through `chat_hook_event` to Slaunt’s MCP service.
AI rationale
The installer’s default hooks transmit prompt and final-reply content to Slaunt’s service, while the README describes the default Codex configuration as metadata-only and chat capture as optional. This is undisclosed runtime collection, so warn rather than block.
Evidence
src/setup/hook-installer.jssrc/desktop/claude-lifecycle.jssrc/desktop/native-claude-connection.jsREADME.md.codex/hooks.json.claude/settings.json
Network endpoints1
central-mcp-ccr-production.up.railway.app/mcp
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 91.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The default Codex hook configuration adds a `chat_hook_event` hook for each prompt and final assistant reply.
- Claude lifecycle handling forwards captured prompt or reply content to the `chat_hook_event` MCP tool.
- The broker connects to Slaunt’s production MCP endpoint.
- The README describes Codex hook data as metadata-only and calls chat capture optional, which does not match the default hook configuration.
Evidence against
- The package has no install, preinstall, or postinstall lifecycle script; setup runs through the `slaunt-hooks install` command.
- The installer has a sign-in and client setup flow, and the observed destination is Slaunt’s own service.
- No automatic collection or transmission of unrelated credentials was identified.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
15 flaggedsrc/desktop/broker-launch-agent.jsView file
3Trigger-reachable persistence chain: manifest.bin -> bin/slaunt-hooks.js -> src/install-flow.js -> src/desktop/broker-launch-agent.js
L3: const path=require('node:path');
L4: const net=require('node:net');
L5: const {execFile}=require('node:child_process');
L6: const {promisify}=require('node:util');
...
L9: const xml=s=>s.replace(/&/g,'&').replace(/</g,'<').replace(/>/g,'>').replace(/"/g,'"').replace(/'/g,''');
L10: function brokerPlist({node=process.execPath,script=path.join(__dirname,'broker-daemon.js')}={}){
L11: if(!path.isAbsolute(node)||!path.isAbsolute(script)||/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/.test(node+script))throw new Error('broker-launch-invalid');
...
L15: try{const root=await fs.lstat(path.dirname(address)),socket=await fs.lstat(address);if(!root.isDirectory()||root.isSy
High
Trigger Reachable Persistence
A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.
src/desktop/broker-launch-agent.jsView on unpkg · L3•matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = slaunt@0.1.19
matchedPath = src/desktop/broker-launch-agent.js
matchedIdentity = npm:c2xhdW50:0.1.19
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
High
Known Malware Source Similarity
Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.
src/desktop/broker-launch-agent.jsView on unpkgFindings
11 High6 Medium6 Low
HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitysrc/setup-flow.js
HighTrigger Reachable Persistencesrc/desktop/broker-launch-agent.js
HighShips High Entropy Blobrelease/SlauntKillBar.zip
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/desktop/broker-launch-agent.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/killbar-enrollment.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/desktop/broker-keychain.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/hidden-oauth.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/native-config.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/setup/codex-guard-supervisor.js
HighKnown Malware Source Similaritysrc/native-oauth.js
HighPrevious Version Dangerous Delta
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to slaunt@0.1.21.
See all versions of slaunt for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of slaunt@0.1.21 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.