sn-flow-client@1.0.2

package.json declares a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node index.js") that runs index.js automatically on npm install. index.js requires child_process, os, http, and https, then collects installer host identity — os.hostname(), process.platform, os.arch(), os.homedir(), os.userInfo() (username/uid/gid/shell), and the output of `whoami` / `id` / cwd via child_process — and POSTs the collected JSON to https://ypraooa298eigl12zisuxg2f76dx1npc.oastify.com/detox56. oastify.com is the Burp Collaborator out-of-band interaction domain; the random subdomain is an attacker-controlled OAST listener. The package has empty author/description/license metadata, no legitimate functionality, and a plausibly-internal-sounding name (sn-flow-client) — consistent with a dependency-confusion probe rather than a real client library. Installing this package causes immediate outbound transmission of installer host/user identifiers to an attacker-controlled endpoint with no user consent. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (40af2ecf250ffc74b1566c2e1b013c1fb2f8e1917dc5878511d1dbaf791c0c48) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified 'sn-flow-client' @ 10.10.10 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.