speed5@1.1.7

speed3@1.1.7 is not a functional Node package. package.json declares `main: sw.js`, but sw.js is a browser ServiceWorker (`importScripts('./8cfc2/hgshm.js')`, `self.addEventListener('install'|'activate'|'fetch'|'message')`) — `require('speed3')` throws immediately in Node, so there is no install-time or import-time code-execution path that touches the installer. The tarball bundles a static web-proxy frontend (bare-mux / Ultraviolet / Scramjet stack, confirmed by `bare-mux: running v2.1.9` in d1g0y/xsv4z.js) plus an index.html popunder that opens https://abdct.com/ on user click/keydown/touchstart with a 15-minute cooldown — browser behavior for visitors of the deployed site, not npm consumers. The tarball also ships auto-publish.sh (`BASE="speed"; TOTAL=5; PARALLEL=2;... pkg.name = '$NAME'; npm publish --silent`), and the recursive nested directories tmp_speed2/ and tmp_speed2/tmp_speed1/ inside the published tarball are direct evidence the author ran the script to mass-publish speed1..speed5 typosquat names. The many heavily-obfuscated assets/*.js files are browser bundles loaded by the deployed index.html and are not reachable from any Node entry point. Routing to human review for namespace-abuse adjudication: the lure is non-functional and the bundled obfuscated assets cannot be fully audited, so a reviewer should confirm the typosquat campaign and request takedown across the speedN family. ## Source: ghsa-malware (f315db6d8f6ea167c5fefd27a41fdf2f5b515f1f52023c8bd617afad1fa411e6) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.