---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/spidra-mcp/v/0.2.3"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/spidra-mcp/v/0.2.3.md"
package: "spidra-mcp"
report_status: "published"
title: "spidra-mcp@0.2.3 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.2.3"
---

# spidra-mcp@0.2.3 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.2.3
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. Installation modifies a foreign FastMCP OAuth consent-screen implementation. Runtime exposes user-invoked web scraping/crawling tools backed by the Spidra service; no confirmed exfiltration chain is present.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Confidence:** 88.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-08T11:33:15.920Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-08T11:33:52.013Z
- **Download time:** 253 ms
- **Static scan time:** 94 ms
- **AI review time:** 35744 ms
- **Total time:** 36093 ms

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installation modifies a foreign FastMCP OAuth consent-screen implementation. Runtime exposes user-invoked web scraping/crawling tools backed by the Spidra service; no confirmed exfiltration chain is present.

- **Trigger:** npm install activates postinstall; running the bin starts the MCP server.

- **Impact:** A shared/hoisted FastMCP consent UI could be altered without an explicit user command, creating an authentication-control-surface risk.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/patch-fastmcp-consent.mjs, dist/index.js, README.md

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-08T11:33:52.013Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** postinstall patch of dependency OAuth consent UI

- **Rationale:** Source inspection does not support the scanner's claimed credential exfiltration, but it confirms an automatic postinstall mutation of a foreign OAuth consent surface. This warrants a warning rather than a block because no concrete malicious chain or consent bypass is present.

- **Files touched:** package.json, scripts/patch-fastmcp-consent.mjs, node\_modules/fastmcp/dist/chunk-OJG4XYXA.js, dist/index.js

- **Network endpoints:** https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth\_callback, https://fonts.googleapis.com, https://fonts.gstatic.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 88.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for:** package.json runs a postinstall hook., scripts/patch-fastmcp-consent.mjs rewrites fastmcp's OAuth consent-screen method in node\_modules., The mutation occurs automatically during npm installation.

- **Evidence against:** The patch is guarded to one exact fastmcp file and method markers., Replacement HTML retains client, provider, scope, transaction ID, approve, and deny rendering., No source evidence of credential/file harvesting, remote payload loading, or consent bypass., dist/index.js uses credentials for the documented Spidra API/OAuth flow only when the MCP server runs.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/spidra-mcp@0.2.3/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/patch-fastmcp-consent.mjs
```

### 2. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. Critical: Hardcoded Runtime Data Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/spidra-mcp@0.2.3/dist/index.js>)

Source sends credentials or rich application records to a package-controlled external receiver enabled by default.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Source sends the broad process environment to a literal external destination.
L16: var require2 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L17: var { version: packageVersion } = require2("../package.json");
L18: var HTTP_MODE = process.env.HTTP_STREAMABLE_SERVER === "true";
L19: var PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 3e3);
...
L56: tokenEndpoint: `${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}/oauth/token`,
L57: // fastmcp's default (loopback-only: http://localhost:*, http://127.0.0.1:*)
L58: // covers Claude Code's CLI-style loopback redirect, but the hosted Claude
...
L76: },
L77: body: JSON.stringify({ access_token: accessToken })
L78: });
...
L82: }
L83: const data = await response.json();
```

### 8. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/spidra-mcp@0.2.3/dist/index.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L16: var require2 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L17: var { version: packageVersion } = require2("../package.json");
L18: var HTTP_MODE = process.env.HTTP_STREAMABLE_SERVER === "true";
L19: var PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 3e3);
...
L56: tokenEndpoint: `${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}/oauth/token`,
L57: // fastmcp's default (loopback-only: http://localhost:*, http://127.0.0.1:*)
L58: // covers Claude Code's CLI-style loopback redirect, but the hosted Claude
...
L76: },
L77: body: JSON.stringify({ access_token: accessToken })
L78: });
...
L82: }
L83: const data = await response.json();
```

### 9. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/spidra-mcp@0.2.3/dist/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L16: var require2 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L17: var { version: packageVersion } = require2("../package.json");
L18: var HTTP_MODE = process.env.HTTP_STREAMABLE_SERVER === "true";
L19: var PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 3e3);
...
L56: tokenEndpoint: `${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}/oauth/token`,
L57: // fastmcp's default (loopback-only: http://localhost:*, http://127.0.0.1:*)
L58: // covers Claude Code's CLI-style loopback redirect, but the hosted Claude
...
L76: },
L77: body: JSON.stringify({ access_token: accessToken })
L78: });
...
L82: }
L83: const data = await response.json();
```

### 10. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/spidra-mcp@0.2.3/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L16: var require2 = createRequire(import.meta.url);
L17: var { version: packageVersion } = require2("../package.json");
L18: var HTTP_MODE = process.env.HTTP_STREAMABLE_SERVER === "true";
L19: var PORT = Number(process.env.PORT || 3e3);
...
L56: tokenEndpoint: `${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}/oauth/token`,
L57: // fastmcp's default (loopback-only: http://localhost:*, http://127.0.0.1:*)
L58: // covers Claude Code's CLI-style loopback redirect, but the hosted Claude
...
L76: },
L77: body: JSON.stringify({ access_token: accessToken })
L78: });
...
L82: }
L83: const data = await response.json();
```

### 11. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 12. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 13. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepare
- **Dependencies:** 4
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 4
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- dotenv ^17.2.2 (Dependency)
- fastmcp ^4.3.2 (Dependency)
- spidra ^0.4.0 (Dependency)
- zod ^4.1.5 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** spidra-mcp
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.2.3
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-07T10:37:49.502Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-08T11:33:48.336Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-08-08T11:33:54.618Z
- **Known versions:** 3
- **Latest version:** 0.2.5
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Official Spidra MCP server — AI-powered web scraping and crawling tools for MCP clients
- **Author:** Spidra
- **Maintainers:** joel-olawanle
- **Keywords:** spidra, mcp, model context protocol, web scraping, crawling, ai
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 6
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 91,906 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/spidra-mcp/v/0.2.3>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/spidra-io/spidra-mcp-server>)
- [Homepage](<https://spidra.io/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/spidra-io/spidra-mcp-server/issues>)