Source inspection found an automatic postinstall customization of FastMCP’s consent screen, with the explicit approval and denial controls preserved. Runtime credential use is directed to the configured Spidra API; no concrete attack behavior was found.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review
Trigger
Package installation runs the postinstall hook; runtime behavior begins when the MCP server handles requests.
Impact
No confirmed credential theft or unrelated control-surface mutation was established.
Mechanism
The hook replaces FastMCP’s consent-screen method. Runtime OAuth introspection and API requests use Spidra credentials with the configured Spidra API endpoint.
Evidence
package.jsondist/index.jsscripts/patch-fastmcp-consent.mjs
Network endpoints2
${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}/oauth/introspect${process.env.SPIDRA_API_URL}